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Abstract
We address themes of distributed cognition by extending recent formal developments in the
theory of individual consciousness. While single minds appear biologically limited to one dynamic
structure of linked cognitive submodules instantiating consciousness, organizations, by contrast,
can support several, sometimes many, such constructs simultaneously, although these usually
operate relatively slowly. System behavior remains, however, constrained not only by culture, but
by a developmental path dependence generated by organizational history, in the context of market
selection pressures. Such highly parallel multitasking – essentially an institutional collective
consciousness – while capable of reducing inattentional blindness and the consequences of failures
within individual workspaces, does not eliminate them, and introduces new characteristic
malfunctions involving the distortion of information sent between workspaces and the possibility
of pathological resilience – dysfunctional institutional lock-in. Consequently, organizations remain
subject to canonical and idiosyncratic failures analogous to, but more complicated than, those
afflicting individuals. Remediation is made difficult by the manner in which pathological externalities
can write images of themselves onto both institutional function and corrective intervention. The
perspective is applied to the failure of AIDS control and treatment in the United States.
Background
Small, disciplined groups of humans are the most fear-
some predators on Earth. In large-scale organization, we
have recast even the topography and ecological dynamics
of the planet. Our institutions, at all scales, are cognitive,
taking the perspectives of Baars [1] and of Atlan and
Cohen [2], in that they perceive patterns of threat or
opportunity, compare those patterns with some internal,
learned or inherited, picture of the world, and then
choose one or a small number of responses from a much
larger repertory of possibilities.
Both individuals and institutions operate within the con-
straints and affordances of culture, which, to take the per-
spective of the evolutionary anthropologist Robert Boyd,
at the individual level, "...is as much a part of human biol-
ogy as the enamel on our teeth..." (e.g. [3]).
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One starting point for understanding the necessity of
including culture in the study of cognition or conscious-
ness at any scale lies in the observations of Nisbett et al.
[4], and others, following the tradition of Markus and
Kitayama [5], regarding fundamental differences in per-
ception between test subjects of Southeast Asian and
Western cultural heritage across an broad realm of experi-
ments. East Asian perspectives are characterized as holistic
and Western as analytic. Nisbett et al. [4] find:
(1) Social organization directs attention to some aspects
of the perceptual field at the expense of others.
(2) What is attended to influences metaphysics.
(3) Metaphysics guides tacit epistemology, that is, beliefs
about the nature of the world and causality.
(4) Epistemology dictates the development and applica-
tion of some cognitive processes at the expense of others.
(5) Social organization can directly affect the plausibility
of metaphysical assumptions, such as whether causality
should be regarded as residing in the field vs. in the object.
(6) Social organization and social practice can directly
influence the development and use of cognitive processes
such as dialectical vs. logical ones.
Nisbett et al. [4] conclude that tools of thought embody a
culture's intellectual history, that tools have theories build
into them, and that users accept these theories, albeit
unknowingly, when they use these tools.
Heine [6] puts the matter as follows:
"Cultural psychology does not view culture as a superficial
wrapping of the self, or as a framework within which
selves interact, but as something that is intrinsic to the
self. It assumes that without culture there is no self, only a
biological entity deprived of its potential... Cultural psy-
chology maintains that the process of becoming a self is
contingent on individuals interacting with and seizing
meanings from the cultural environment..."
Clearly, culture must have an intimate relation with the
cognitive functioning of the organizations in which indi-
vidual humans are embedded and with which they are
synergistic in an apparent evolutionary exaptation of indi-
vidual consciousness (e.g. [7]).
The scientific study of individual consciousness has again
become popular, after nearly a century of silence enforced
by ideological diktat – the 'dark night of behaviorism' –
and Baars' Global Workspace Theory (GWT), [1,8] has
emerged as the first among equals in the Darwinian com-
petition between theoretical approaches (e.g. [9]). Other
viable viewpoints have, in general, branched off from this
seminal line of work. Even Maia and Cleeremans [10], for
example, who use connectionist models, state that
"The main difference between our perspective and that of
Dehaene, Baars, and their [other global workspace] col-
laborators, is that they take the brain to consist of special-
ized modular processes, whereas we believe that
computation is more distributed and interactive at a glo-
bal scale... [T]he existence of massive recurrent connec-
tions at all levels of the cortex makes the existence of
strongly encapsulated modules... unlikely. In any case,
this may simply be a matter of emphasis, as Dehaene et al.
suggest that 'global workspace neurons' are widely distrib-
uted..."
Wallace and colleagues [11-15] have developed the first
comprehensive mathematical model of GWT and many of
its possible variants, using a Dretske-like information the-
ory formalism [16-19], extended by techniques from sta-
tistical physics, the Large Deviations Program of applied
probability, and the topological theory of highly parallel
computation. The 'necessary conditions' arguments based
on application of the Rate Distortion and Shannon-
McMillan Theorems to models of individual cognitive
process can, we will show in some detail, be extended in a
canonical fashion to institutional cognition of various
orders. One particular advance is invocation of a 'broken
groupoid' formalism which, based on mutual informa-
tion measures, provides a highly natural means for treat-
ing increasing interaction between individual cognitive
modules. This finesses debates on strong encapsulation.
Although individual human consciousness has been
socially constructed as a great scientific mystery, institu-
tional cognition is, in fact, far more complex and varied,
significantly less constrained by biological evolution, and
considerably more efficient in many important respects.
Hollan et al. [20], expanding on previous work by Hutch-
ins and collaborators (e.g. [21]), describe these matters in
terms of a distributed cognition paradigm:
"The theory of distributed cognition, like any cognitive
theory, seeks to understand the organization of cognitive
systems. Unlike traditional theories, however, it extends
the reach of what is considered cognitive beyond the indi-
vidual to encompass interactions between people and
with resources and materials in the environment. It is
important from the outset to understand that distributed
cognition refers to a perspective on all of cognition, rather
than a particular kind of cognition... Distributed cogni-
tion looks for cognitive processes, wherever they may
occur, on the basis of the functional relationships of ele-Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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ments that participate together in the process. A process is
not cognitive simply because it happens in a brain, nor is
a process noncognitive simply because it happens in the
interactions between many brains... In distributed cogni-
tion one expects to find a system that can dynamically
configure itself to bring subsystems into coordination to
accomplish various functions. A cognitive process is
delimited by the functional relationships among the ele-
ments that participate in it, rather than by the spatial colo-
cation of the elements... Whereas traditional views look
for cognitive events in the manipulation of symbols inside
individual actors, distributed cognition looks for a
broader class of cognitive events and does not expect all
such events to be encompasses by the skin or skull of an
individual...
-Cognitive processes may be distributed across the mem-
bers of a social group.
-Cognitive processes may involve coordination between
internal and external (material or environmental) struc-
ture.
-Processes may be distributed through time in such a way
that the products of earlier events can transform the
nature of later events."
Our approach revolves around a 'dual information
source', a kind of quasi-language, which is to be associated
with certain classes of cognitive process, however these
may be instantiated – within or between individuals, or
related to systems involving individuals, groups, and their
various cultural artifacts.
The ability to engage in culturally-sculpted and enabled
organizational cognition, in fact, may be as fundamental
to human survival as individual consciousness, which
appears to be a very ancient evolutionary adaptation. The
dual heritage systems of genes and culture serve at both
individual and collective scales of human endeavor [3].
According to the cultural anthropologists, the structures,
functions, and innate character of organizational behav-
ior are greatly variable and highly adaptable across social
and physical geography, and across history. Individual
human consciousness, by contrast, although profoundly
shaped by, and indeed synergistic with, culture, remains
constrained by the primary biological necessity of single-
tasking, leading to the striking phenomenon of inatten-
tional blindness (IAB) when the Rate Distortion Manifold
of consciousness become necessarily focused on one pri-
mary process to the virtual exclusion of others which
might be expected to intrude (e.g. [14,22-24]).
Simons and Chabris [25] detail a particularly spectacular
example of IAB. A videotape was made of a basketball
game between teams in white and black jerseys. Experi-
mental subjects who viewed the tape were asked to keep
silent mental counts of either the total number of passes
made by one or the other of the teams, or separate counts
of the number of bounce and areal passes. During the
game, a figure in a full gorilla suit appears, faces the cam-
era, beats its breast, and walks off the court. About one
half of the experimental subjects completely failed to
notice the Gorilla during the experiment. See [26] for an
extended discussion, and [27] for more recent experi-
ments.
Other case histories, involving an aircraft crew which
became fixated on an unexpectedly flashing control panel
light during a landing, or a man walking a railroad track
while having a cell phone conversation, are less benign.
Generalizing a second order treatment of Baars' Global
Workspace model of individual consciousness to organi-
zational structures will suggest the possibility of an analo-
gous collective multitasking, effectively an institutional
collective consciousness far more complex than the indi-
vidual case. There will emerge, however, an institutional
analog to individual inattentional blindness, and addi-
tional failure modes specific to the complication of com-
munication between multiple workspaces, as well as those
related to the failure of individual workspaces within the
organization, and to pathological 'lock-in'. Remediation
appears severely limited by the effects on it of the external-
ities so often responsible for the failures themselves.
We begin with an outline of recent work on individual
consciousness as a kind of second order iteration of sim-
ple cognition, and then make the extensions needed to
describe institutional multiple workspaces and their fail-
ure modes.
Formal theory
1. The Global Workspace model of individual 
consciousness
The central ideas of Baars' Global Workspace Theory of
individual consciousness are as follows [28]:
(1) The brain can be viewed as a collection of distributed
specialized networks (processors).
(2) Consciousness is associated with a global workspace
in the brain – a fleeting memory capacity whose focal con-
tents are widely distributed (broadcast) to many uncon-
scious specialized networks.
(3) Conversely, a global workspace can also serve to inte-
grate many competing and cooperating input networks.Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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(4) Some unconscious networks, called contexts, shape
conscious contents, for example unconscious parietal
maps modulate visual feature cells that underlie the per-
ception of color in the ventral stream.
(5) Such contexts work together jointly to constrain con-
scious events.
(6) Motives and emotions can be viewed as goal contexts.
(7) Executive functions work as hierarchies of goal con-
texts. 
Although this basic approach has been the central focus of
many researchers for two decades, consciousness studies
has only recently, in the context of a deluge of empirical
results from brain imaging experiments, begun digesting
the perspective and preparing to move on.
Theory, however, sadly lags experiment. As Atmanspacher
[29] has put it,
"To formulate a serious, clear-cut and transparent formal
framework for cognitive neuroscience is a challenge com-
parable to the early stage of physics four centuries ago."
Currently popular agent-based and artificial neural net-
work (ANN) treatments of cognition, consciousness and
other higher order mental functions, to take Krebs' view,
[30] are little more than sufficiency arguments, in the
same sense that a Fourier series expansion can be empiri-
cally fitted to nearly any function over a fixed interval
without providing real understanding of the underlying
structure. Necessary conditions, as Dretske argues [16-19],
give considerably more insight.
Wallace [11-14] in effect addresses Baars' theme from
Dretske's viewpoint, examining the necessary conditions
which the asymptotic limit theorems of information the-
ory impose on the Global Workspace or any similar
broadcast system. A central outcome of that work is the
incorporation, in a natural manner, of constraints on
individual consciousness, i.e. what Baars calls contexts. A
particular concern of this work, however, is with the sur-
prisingly wide spectrum of mechanisms which can poten-
tially broadcast focal contents.
The extension to institutional collective consciousness
requires examining how cognitive modules can multitask,
engaging in more than one global broadcast at the same
time, which normal individual human consciousness
does not do. The obvious tradeoff, of course, is the very
rapid flow of individual consciousness, a matter of a few
hundred milliseconds, as opposed to the much slower, if
considerably more comprehensive, operations of institu-
tional generalizations.
2. Cognition as an information source
Cognition is not consciousness (or institutional collective
consciousness, as we will define it). Most mental, many
physiological, and a plethora of institutional, functions,
while cognitive in a formal sense, hardly ever become
entrained into the global broadcast of individual con-
sciousness (or, as we shall see, the many such systems of
institutional collective consciousness): one seldom is able
to consciously regulate immune function, blood pressure,
or the details of binocular tracking and bipedal motion,
except to decide 'what shall I look at', 'where shall I walk'.
Nonetheless, many individual cognitive processes, con-
scious or unconscious, appear intimately related to lan-
guage, broadly speaking. The construction is fairly
straightforward [11-14,31].
Atlan and Cohen [2] and Cohen [32] argue, in the context
of immune cognition, that the essence of cognitive func-
tion involves comparison of a perceived signal with an
internal, learned picture of the world, and then, upon that
comparison, choice of one response from a much larger
repertoire of possible responses.
More formally, an incoming, highly structured, sensory
signal is mixed in an unspecified but systematic algorith-
mic manner with a structured pattern of internal ongoing
activity to create a combined path, x = (a0, a1, ..., an, ...).
Each ak thus represents some functional composition of
internal and external messages. Wallace [11] provides two
neural network examples.
The combined path x is then fed into a highly nonlinear,
but otherwise similarly unspecified, decision oscillator, h,
which generates an output h(x) that is an element of one
of two disjoint sets B0 and B1 of possible responses.
Let
B0 ≡ b0, ..., bk,
B1 ≡ bk+1, ..., bm.
If
h(x) ∈ B0,
the pattern is not recognized, and no action is taken. If
h(x) ∈ B1,
the pattern is recognized, and some action bj, k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m
takes place.Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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The principal objects of formal interest are paths x which
trigger pattern recognition-and-response. That is, given a
fixed initial state a0, we examine all possible subsequent
paths x beginning with a0 and leading to the event h(x) ∈
B1. Thus h(a0, ..., aj) ∈ B0 for all 0 <j <m, but h(a0, ..., am)
∈ B1.
For each positive integer n, let N(n) be the number of high
probability grammatical and syntactical paths of length n
which begin with some particular a0 and lead to the con-
dition h(x) ∈ B1. Call such paths 'meaningful', assuming,
not unreasonably, that N(n) will be considerably less than
the number of all possible paths of length n leading from
a0 to the condition h(x) ∈ B1.
While the combining algorithm generating the ai, the
form of the nonlinear oscillator, and the details of gram-
mar and syntax, are all unspecified in this model, the crit-
ical assumption which permits inference on necessary
conditions constrained by the asymptotic limit theorems
of information theory is that the finite limit
both exists and is independent of the path x.
We call such a pattern recognition-and-response cognitive
process ergodic, whether it occurs within an individual or
an institution. Not all cognitive processes are likely to be
ergodic in this sense, implying that H, if it indeed exists at
all, is path dependent, although extension to nearly
ergodic processes, in a certain sense, seems possible [11].
Invoking the spirit of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem,
essentially the zero-error limit of the Rate Distortion The-
orem discussed in the Mathematical Appendix, allows
definition of an adiabatically, piecewise stationary,
ergodic information source (APSE) X associated with sto-
chastic variates Xj having joint and conditional probabili-
ties P(a0, ..., an) and P(an|a0, ..., an-1) such that appropriate
joint and conditional Shannon uncertainties satisfy the
classic relations
This APSE information source is defined as dual to the
underlying ergodic cognitive process [11].
The essence of 'adiabatic' is that, when the information
source is parametized according to some appropriate
scheme, within continuous 'pieces' of that parametiza-
tion, changes in parameters take place slowly enough so
that the information source remains as close to stationary
and ergodic as is needed to make the fundamental theo-
rems work. By 'stationary' we mean that probabilities do
not change in time, and by 'ergodic' (roughly) that cross-
sectional means converge to long-time averages. Between
'pieces' one invokes various kinds of phase change formal-
ism, for example renormalization theory in cases where a
mean field approximation is appropriate [11]. Here we
will take a somewhat different approach.
Again, not all cognitive processes are likely to have such a
dual source, in this formal sense, and the theory is
restricted to those which do.
Recall that the Shannon uncertainties H(...) are cross-sec-
tional law-of-large-numbers sums of the form - ∑k Pk
log[Pk], where the Pk constitute a probability distribution.
See [33-35] for the standard details.
3. The cognitive modular network symmetry groupoid
A formal equivalence class algebra can be constructed by
choosing different origins a0 and defining equivalence by
the existence of a high probability meaningful path con-
necting other states to those origins. Disjoint partition by
equivalence class, analogous to orbit equivalence classes
for dynamical systems, defines the vertices of the pro-
posed network of cognitive dual languages. Each vertex
then represents a different information source dual to a
cognitive process. This is not a representation of a neural
network as such, or of some circuit in silicon. It is, rather,
an abstract set of information sources dual to the cogni-
tive processes instantiated by either biological wetware,
social process, or their hybrids with each other and with
electronic or other cultural artifacts.
This structure generates a groupoid, in the sense of Wein-
stein [36]. States aj, ak in a set A are related by the groupoid
morphism if and only if there exists a high probability
grammatical path connecting them to the same origin a0,
and tuning across the various possible ways in which that
can happen – the different cognitive languages – para-
metizes the set of equivalence relations and creates the
groupoid. See figure 1. This assertion requires some devel-
opment.
Note that not all possible pairs of states (aj, ak) can be con-
nected by such a morphism, i.e. by a high probability,
grammatical and syntactical cognitive path having some
particular origin, but those that can define the groupoid
element, a morphism g = (aj, ak) having the natural inverse
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ingful path to an origin, it is possible to define 'natural'
end-point maps α(g) = aj, β(g) = ak from the set of mor-
phisms G into A, and a formally associative product in the
groupoid g1g2 provided α(g1g2) = α(g1), β(g1g2) = β(g2),
and β(g1) = α(g2). Then the product is defined, and asso-
ciative, i.e. (g1g2)g3 = g1(g2g3).
In addition there are natural left and right identity ele-
ments λg, ρg such that λgg = g = gρg [36].
An orbit of the groupoid G over A is an equivalence class
for the relation aj ~ Gak if and only if there is a groupoid
element g with α(g) = aj and β(g)= ak.
The isotopy group of a ∈ X consists of those g in G with
α(g) = a = β(g).
In essence a groupoid is a category in which all mor-
phisms have an inverse, here defined in terms of connec-
tion by a meaningful path of an information source dual
to a cognitive process.
If G is any groupoid over A, the map (α, β) : G → A × A is
a morphism from G to the pair groupoid of A. The image
of (α, β) is the orbit equivalence relation ~ G, and the
functional kernel is the union of the isotropy groups. If f :
X → Y is a function, then the kernel of f, ker(f) = [(x1, x2)
∈ X × X : f = f(x1) = f(x2)] defines an equivalence relation.
As Weinstein (1996) points out, the morphism (α, β) sug-
gests another way of looking at groupoids. A groupoid
over A identifies not only which elements of A are equiv-
alent to one another (isomorphic), but it also parametizes
the different ways (isomorphisms) in which two elements can
be equivalent, i.e. all possible information sources dual to
some set of cognitive processes. Given the information
theoretic characterization of cognition presented above,
Two (disjoint) equivalence classes of states defined through connection by meaningful paths with different base points, (a, 0),  (b, 0) Figure 1
Two (disjoint) equivalence classes of states defined through connection by meaningful paths with different base points, (a, 0), 
(b, 0).Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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this produces a full modular cognitive network in a highly
natural manner.
Brown [37] describes the fundamental structure as fol-
lows:
"A groupoid should be thought of as a group with many
objects, or with many identities... A groupoid with one
object is essentially just a group. So the notion of
groupoid is an extension of that of groups. It gives an
additional convenience, flexibility and range of applica-
tions...
EXAMPLE 1. A disjoint union [of groups] G = ∪λGλ, λ ∈ Λ
is a groupoid: the product ab is defined if and only if a, b
belong to the same Gλ, and ab is then just the product in
the group Gλ.
There is an identity 1λ for each λ ∈ Λ. The maps α, β coin-
cide and map Gλ to λ, λ ∈ Λ.
EXAMPLE 2. An equivalence relation R  on [a set] X
becomes a groupoid with α, β : R → X the two projections,
and product (x, y)(y, z) = (x, z) whenever (x, y), (y, z) ∈ R.
There is an identity, namely (x, x), for each x ∈ X..."
Weinstein [36] makes the following fundamental point:
"Almost every interesting equivalence relation on a space
B arises in a natural way as the orbit equivalence relation
of some groupoid G over B. Instead of dealing directly
with the orbit space B/G as an object in the category Smap
of sets and mappings, one should consider instead the
groupoid  G  itself as an object in the category Ghtp of
groupoids and homotopy classes of morphisms."
Later we will explore homotopy in paths generated by
information sources.
The groupoid approach has become quite popular in the
study of networks of coupled dynamical systems which
can be defined by differential equation models, (e.g. [38-
40]). Here we have outlined how to extend the technique
to networks of interacting information sources which, in
a dual sense, characterize cognitive processes, and cannot
at all be described by the usual differential equation mod-
els. These latter, it seems, are much the spiritual offspring
of 18th Century mechanical clocks. Cognitive and con-
scious processes in humans involve neither computers
nor clocks, but remain constrained by the limit theorems
of information theory, and these permit scientific infer-
ence on necessary conditions.
4. Internal forces breaking the symmetry groupoid
The symmetry groupoid for cognitive modules is gener-
ated by the possible ways in which states aj, ak can be con-
nected to some particular origin by a meaningful path of
an information source dual to a cognitive process. These
are different, and in this approximation, non-interacting
cognitive processes. But symmetry groupoids, like sym-
metry groups, are made to be broken: by internal cross-
talk akin to spin-orbit interactions within a symmetric
atom, and by cross-talk with slower, external, information
sources, akin to putting a symmetric atom in a powerful
magnetic or electric field.
Figure 2 illustrates the problem, in which the states
labeled 1, 2, 3 are connected to two different base points,
written as (a, 0), (b, 0).
First suppose that linkages can fleetingly occur between
the ordinarily disjoint cognitive modules defined by the
network groupoid. In the spirit of [11], this is represented
by establishment of a non-zero mutual information meas-
ure between them: a cross-talk which breaks the strict
groupoid symmetry developed above.
Wallace [11] describes this structure in terms of fixed mag-
nitude disjunctive strong ties which give the equivalence
class partitioning of modules, and nondisjunctive weak
ties which link modules across the partition, and para-
metizes the overall structure by the average strength of the
weak ties, to use Granovetter's [41] term. A different
approach, [12], outlined here, is to simply look at the
average number of fixed-strength nondisjunctive links in
a random topology. These are obviously just two analyti-
cally tractable limits of a much more complicated regime
of possibilities. This circumstance, in fact, suggests the
operation of selection pressures both in the evolution of
individual consciousness and in the Lamarckian evolu-
tion of institutions, matters discussed elsewhere [7].
Since we know nothing about how the cross-talk connec-
tions can occur, we – at first – construct a simple random
graph in the classic Erdos/Renyi manner. Suppose there
are M disjoint cognitive modules – M elements of the
equivalence class algebra of languages dual to some cog-
nitive process – which we now take to be the vertices of a
possible graph.
For M very large, following [42], when edges (defined by
establishment of a fixed-strength mutual information
measure between the graph vertices) are added at random
to M initially disconnected vertices, a remarkable transi-
tion occurs when the number of edges becomes approxi-
mately M/2. Erdos and Renyi [43] studied random graphs
with M vertices and (M/2)(1 + μ) edges as M → ∞, and dis-Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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covered that such graphs almost surely have the following
properties [44-49]:
[1] If μ < 0, only small trees and unicyclic components are
present, where a unicyclic component is a tree with one
additional edge; moreover, the size of the largest tree com-
ponent is (μ - ln(1 + μ))-1 + (log  log  n).
[2] If μ = 0, however, the largest component has size of
order M2/3.
[3] If μ  > 0, there is a unique giant component (GC)
whose size is of order M; in fact, the size of this compo-
nent is asymptotically αM, where μ = -α-1 [ln(1 - α) - 1],
which has an explicit solution for α in terms of the Lam-
bert W-function. Thus, for example, a random graph with
approximately M ln(2) edges will have a giant component
containing ≈ M/2 vertices.
Such a phase transition initiates a new, collective, cogni-
tive phenomenon. At the level of the individual mind,
unconscious cognitive modules link up to become the
General Broadcast associated with consciousness, emer-
gently defined by a set of cross-talk mutual information
measures between interacting unconscious cognitive sub-
modules. The source uncertainty, H, of the language dual
to the collective cognitive process, which characterizes the
richness of the cognitive language of the workspace, will
grow as some monotonic function of the size of the GC,
as more and more unconscious processes are incorporated
into it. Wallace [11] provides details.
Others have taken similar network phase transition
approaches to assemblies of neurons, e.g. neuropercola-
tion [50,51], but their work has not focused explicitly on
modular networks of cognitive processes, which may or
may not be instantiated by neurons. Restricting analysis to
such modular networks finesses much of the underlying

Complications due to crosstalk between information sources: States labeled 1, 2, 3 can be connected by meaningful paths with  two different base points, (a, 0), (b, 0) Figure 2
Complications due to crosstalk between information sources: States labeled 1, 2, 3 can be connected by meaningful paths with 
two different base points, (a, 0), (b, 0). Defining equivalence classes becomes much more difficult.Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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conceptual difficulty, and permits use of the asymptotic
limit theorems of information theory and the import of
techniques from statistical physics, a matter we will dis-
cuss later.
Again, this is only one limit in a continuum of possible
models. Another limiting case involves a mean field
approximation which examines changes in the average
strength of coupling, rather than the average number of
links [11].
5. External forces breaking the symmetry groupoid
Just as a higher order information source, associated with
the GC of a random or semirandom graph, can be con-
structed out of the interlinking of unconscious cognitive
modules by mutual information, so too external informa-
tion sources, for example in humans the cognitive
immune and other physiological systems, and embedding
sociocultural structures, can be represented as slower-act-
ing information sources whose influence on the GC can
be felt in a collective mutual information measure. For
machines or institutions these would be the onion-like
'structured environment', to be viewed as among Baars'
contexts [1,8,28]. The collective mutual information
measure will, through the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition
Theorem which generalizes the Shannon-McMillan Theo-
rem, be the splitting criterion for high and low probability
joint paths across the entire system.
The tool for this is network information theory ([35], p.
388). Given three interacting information sources, Y1, Y2,
Z, the splitting criterion, taking Z as the 'external context',
is given by
I(Y1, Y2|Z) = H(Z) + H(Y1|Z) + H(Y2|Z) - H(Y1, Y2, Z),
(2)
where  H(..|..) and H(..,..,..) represent conditional and
joint uncertainties [33-35].
This generalizes to
If we assume the General Broadcast/Giant Component to
involve a very rapidly shifting, and indeed highly tunable,
dual information source X, embedding contextual cogni-
tive modules like the immune system will have a set of sig-
nificantly slower-responding sources Yj,  j  = 1..m, and
external social, cultural and other environmental proc-
esses will be characterized by even more slowly-acting
sources Zk, k = 1..n. Mathematical induction on equation
(3) gives a complicated expression for a mutual informa-
tion splitting criterion which we write as
I(X|Y1, .., Ym|Z1, .., Zn).   (4)
This encompasses, at the individual level, a fully interpen-
etrating biopsychosociocultural structure for conscious-
ness, one in which Baars' contexts act as important, but
flexible, boundary conditions, defining the underlying
topology available to the far more rapidly shifting global
workspace [11-14].
This result does not commit the mereological fallacy, of
which Bennett and Hacker [52] accuse the many exces-
sively neurocentric perspectives on consciousness in
humans, that is, the mistake of imputing to a part of a sys-
tem the characteristics which require functional entirety.
The underlying concept of this fallacy should extend to
machines or organizations interacting with their environ-
ments.
The central argument of this paper is to generalize this
result to the institutional level, albeit operating on a time
scale much slower than individual consciousness.
6. Punctuation phenomena
As many have noted – see [11-14] for more discussion –
equation (1),
is homologous to the thermodynamic limit in the defini-
tion of the free energy density of a physical system. This
has the form
where F is the free energy density, K the inverse tempera-
ture, V the system volume, and Z(K) is the partition func-
tion defined by the system Hamiltonian.
Wallace [11] shows at some length how this homology
permits the natural transfer of renormalization methods
from statistical mechanics to information theory. In the
spirit of the Large Deviations Program of applied proba-
bility theory, this produces phase transitions and analogs
to evolutionary punctuation in systems characterized by
piecewise, adiabatically stationary, ergodic information
sources. These biological phase changes appear to be
ubiquitous in natural systems and can be expected to
dominate machine and organizational behaviors as well.
Wallace [53] uses these arguments to explore the differ-
ences and similarities between evolutionary punctuation
in genetic and learning plateaus in neural systems.
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7. Institutional collective consciousness
The random network development above is predicated on
there being a variable average number of fixed-strength
linkages between components. Clearly, the mutual infor-
mation measure of cross-talk is not inherently fixed, but
can continuously vary in magnitude. This can be
addressed by a parametized renormalization. In essence
the modular network structure linked by mutual informa-
tion interactions has a topology depending on the degree
of interaction of interest. Suppose we define an interac-
tion parameter ω, a real positive number, and look at geo-
metric structures defined in terms of linkages which are
zero if mutual information is less than, and 'renormal-
ized' to unity if greater than, ω. Any given ω will define a
regime of giant components of network elements linked
by mutual information greater than or equal to it.
The fundamental conceptual trick at this point is to invert the
argument : A given topology for the giant component will,
in turn, define some critical value, ωC so that network ele-
ments interacting by mutual information less than that
value will be unable to participate, i.e. will be locked out
and not be consciously perceived. We hence are assuming
that the ω is a tunable, syntactically-dependent, detection
limit, and depends critically on the instantaneous topol-
ogy of the giant component defining, for the human
mind, the general broadcast of consciousness. That topol-
ogy is, fundamentally, the basic tunable syntactic filter
across the underlying modular symmetry groupoid, and
variation in ω is only one aspect of a much more general
topological shift. More detailed analysis is given below in
terms of a topological rate distortion manifold.
There is considerable empirical evidence from fMRI brain
imaging experiments to show that individual human con-
sciousness involves a single global component, a matter
leading necessarily to the phenomenon of inattentional
blindness [14]. Cognitive submodules within institutions
– individuals, departments, formal and informal work-
groups – by contrast, can do more than one thing, and
indeed, are usually required to multitask. Clearly this will
lessen the probability of inattentional blindness, but does
not eliminate it, and introduces other failure modes.
We must, for organizations as opposed to individual
minds, postulate a set of crosstalk information measures
between cognitive submodules, each associated with its
own giant component having its own special topology.
Suppose the set of giant components at some 'time' k is
characterized by a set of parameters Ωk ≡ ,  ..., .
Fixed parameter values define a particular giant compo-
nent set having a particular set of topological structures.
Suppose that, over a sequence of 'times' the set of giant
components can be characterized by a (possibly coarse-
grained) path xn = Ω0, Ω1, ..., Ωn-1 having significant serial
correlations which, in fact, permit definition of an adia-
batically, piecewise stationary, ergodic (APSE) informa-
tion source in the sense above. Call that information
source X.
Suppose, again in the manner of [11,14], that a set of
(external or internal) signals impinging on the set of giant
components, is also highly structured and forms another
APSE information source Y which interacts not only with
the system of interest globally, but specifically with the
tuning parameters of the set of giant components charac-
terized by X. Y is necessarily associated with a set of paths
yn.
Pair the two sets of paths into a joint path zn ≡ (xn, yn), and
invoke some inverse coupling parameter, K, between the
information sources and their paths. By the arguments of
[11] this leads to phase transition punctuation of I[K], the
mutual information between X and Y, under either the
Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem, or, given a dis-
tortion measure, under the Rate Distortion Theorem.
I[K] is a splitting criterion between high and low probabil-
ity pairs of paths, and partakes of the homology with free
energy density described above. Attentional focusing by
the institution then itself becomes a punctuated event in
response to increasing linkage between the organization
and an external structured signal, or some particular sys-
tem of internal events. This iterated argument parallels the
extension of the General Linear Model into the Hierarchi-
cal Linear Model of regression theory.
Call this the Hierarchical Cognitive Model (HCM). For
individual consciousness, there is only one giant compo-
nent. For an institution, there will be a larger, and often
very large, set of them.
This leads to the possibility of new failure modes related
to impaired communication between Giant Components.
That is, a complication specific to high order institutional
cognition lies in the necessity of information transfer
between giant components. The form and function of
such interactions will, of course, be determined by the
nature of the particular institution, but, synchronous or
asynchronous, contact between giant components is cir-
cumscribed by the Rate Distortion Theorem. That theo-
rem, reviewed in the Mathematical Appendix, states that,
for a given maximum acceptable critical average distor-
tion, there is a limiting maximum information transmis-
sion rate, such that messages sent at less than that limit are
guaranteed to have average distortion less than the critical
ω1
k ωm
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maximum. Too rapid transmission between parallel glo-
bal workspaces – information overload – violates that
condition, and guarantees large average distortion. This is
a likely failure mode which appears unique to multiple
workspace systems which, if the workspaces are suffi-
ciently numerous, diverse, and able to communicate accu-
rately with each other, may otherwise have a lessened
probability of inattentional blindness.
Other failure modes will become apparent in due course.
8. The dynamical groupoid
A fundamental homology between the information
source uncertainty dual to a cognitive process and the free
energy density of a physical system arises, in part, from the
formal similarity between their definitions in the asymp-
totic limit. Information source uncertainty can be defined
as in equation (1). This is quite analogous to the free
energy density of a physical system, equation (5).
Feynman [54] provides a series of physical examples,
based on Bennett's work, where this homology is, in fact,
an identity, at least for very simple systems. Bennett
argues, in terms of idealized irreducibly elementary com-
puting machines, that the information contained in a
message can be viewed as the work saved by not needing
to recompute what has been transmitted.
Feynman explores in some detail Bennett's ideal micro-
scopic machine designed to extract useful work from a
transmitted message. The essential argument is that com-
puting, in any form, takes work. Thus the more compli-
cated a cognitive process, measured by its information
source uncertainty, the greater its energy consumption,
and our ability to provide energy to the brain is limited:
Typically a unit of brain tissue consumes an order of mag-
nitude more energy than a unit of any other tissue. Inat-
tentional blindness emerges as an inevitable
thermodynamic limit on processing capacity in a topolog-
ically-fixed global workspace, i.e. one which has been
strongly configured about a particular task. Institutional
generalizations seem obvious.
Understanding the time dynamics of cognitive systems
away from phase transition critical points requires a phe-
nomenology similar to the Onsager relations of nonequi-
librium thermodynamics. If the dual source uncertainty of
a cognitive process is parametized by some vector of
quantities K ≡ (K1, ..., Km), then, in analogy with nonequi-
librium thermodynamics, gradients in the Kj of the disor-
der, defined as
become of central interest.
Equation (6) is similar to the definition of entropy in
terms of the free energy density of a physical system, as
suggested by the homology between free energy density
and information source uncertainty.
Pursuing the homology further, the generalized Onsager
relations defining temporal dynamics become
where the Lj, i are, in first order, constants reflecting the
nature of the underlying cognitive phenomena. The L-
matrix is to be viewed empirically, in the same spirit as the
slope and intercept of a regression model, and may have
structure far different than familiar from more simple
chemical or physical processes. The ∂S/∂K are analogous
to thermodynamic forces in a chemical system, and may
be subject to override by external physiological driving
mechanisms [55]. We will return to this below in terms of
analogs to ecosystem resilience.
Equations (6) and (7) can be derived in a simple parame-
ter-free covariant manner which relies on the underlying
topology of the information source space implicit to the
development. Different cognitive phenomena have,
according to our development, dual information sources,
and we are interested in the local properties of the system
near a particular reference state. We impose a topology on
the system, so that, near a particular 'language' A, dual to
an underlying cognitive process, there is (in some sense)
an open set U of closely similar languages Â, such that A,
Â ⊂ U. Note that it may be necessary to coarse-grain the
system's responses to define these information sources.
The problem is to proceed in such a way as to preserve the
underlying essential topology, while eliminating 'high fre-
quency noise'. The formal tools for this can be found, e.g.,
in Chapter 8 of [56].
Since the information sources dual to the cognitive proc-
esses are similar, for all pairs of languages A, Â in U, it is
possible to:
[1] Create an embedding alphabet which includes all sym-
bols allowed to both of them.
[2] Define an information-theoretic distortion measure in
that extended, joint alphabet between any high probabil-
ity (i.e. grammatical and syntactical) paths in A and Â,
which we write as d(Ax, Âx) [35]. Note that these lan-
guages do not interact, in this approximation.
[3] Define a metric on U, for example,
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using an appropriate integration limit argument over the
high probability paths. Note that the integration in the
denominator is over different paths within A itself, while
in the numerator it is between different paths in A and Â.
Consideration suggests   is a formal metric, having
(A, B) ≥ 0,  (A, A) = 0,  (A, B) =  (B, A), (A,
C) ≤ ( A, B) +  (B, C).
Other metrics seem possible on U.
Note that these three conditions can be used to define
equivalence classes of languages, where previously we
defined equivalence classes of states which could be linked
by high probability, grammatical and syntactical, paths.
This led to the characterization of different information
sources. Here we construct an entity, formally a topologi-
cal manifold having a metric, which is an equivalence
class of information sources. This is, we will show, a clas-
sic differentiable manifold. The set of such equivalence
classes defines the dynamical groupoid, and questions arise
regarding mechanisms, internal or external, which can
break that groupoid symmetry, as in the previous exam-
ple.
Indeed, since H  and   are both scalars, a 'covariant'
derivative can be defined directly as
where H(A) is the source uncertainty of language A.
Suppose the system to be set in some reference configura-
tion A0.
To obtain the unperturbed dynamics of that state, impose
a Legendre transform using this derivative, defining
another scalar
S ≡ H -  dH/d .   (10)
The simplest possible Onsager relation – again an empir-
ical equation like a regression model – in this case
becomes
d /dt = LdS/d ,   (11)
where t is the time and dS/d . represents an analog to
the thermodynamic force in a chemical system. This is
seen as acting on the reference state A0. For
the system is quasistable, a Black hole, if you will, and
externally imposed forcing mechanisms will be needed to
effect a transition to a different state. We shall explore this
circumstance below in terms of the concept of ecosystem
resilience.
Conversely, changing the direction of the second condi-
tion, so that
leads to a repulsive peak, a White hole, representing a pos-
sibly unattainable realm of states.
Explicit parametization of   introduces standard – and
quite considerable – notational complications (e.g.
[56,57]): Imposing a metric for different cognitive dual
languages parametized by K leads to Riemannian, or even
Finsler, geometries, including the usual geodesies (e.g.
[55]).
We have defined a new groupoid for the system based on
a particular set of equivalence classes of information
sources dual to cognitive processes. That groupoid parsi-
moniously characterizes the available dynamical mani-
folds, and, in precisely the sense of the earlier
development, breaking of the groupoid symmetry creates
more complex objects of considerable interest, which will
be studied below. This leads to the possibility, indeed, the
necessity, of Deus ex Machina executive mechanisms forc-
ing transitions between the different possible modes
within and across dynamic manifolds.
Equivalence classes of states gave dual information
sources. Equivalence classes of information sources give
different characteristic system dynamics. Later we will
examine equivalence classes of paths within dynamic
manifolds, which will produce different directed homot-
opy topologies characterizing them. This introduces the
possibility of different quasi-stable resilience modes
within individual dynamic manifolds. Ultimately we are
identifying a topology which permits the patching-
together of substructures into larger composites.
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The next important structural iteration, however, is, in
some respects, significantly more complicated than a dif-
ferentiable manifold.
9. The rate distortion manifold
The second order iteration above – analogous to expand-
ing the General Linear Model to the Hierarchical Linear
Model – which involved paths in parameter space, can
itself be significantly extended. This produces a general-
ized tunable retina model which can be interpreted as a
Rate Distortion Manifold, a concept which further opens
the way for import of tools from geometry and topology.
Suppose, now, that threshold behavior for institutional
reaction requires some elaborate system of nonlinear rela-
tionships defining a set of renormalization parameters Ωk
≡  , ...,  . The critical assumption is that there is a tun-
able zero order state, and that changes about that state are,
in first order, relatively small, although their effects on
punctuated process may not be at all small. Thus, given an
initial m-dimensional vector Ωk, the parameter vector at
time k + 1, Ωk+1, can, in first order, be written as
Ωk+1 ≈ Rk+1Ωk,   (13)
where Rt+1 is an m × m matrix, having m2 components.
If the initial parameter vector at time k = 0 is Ω0, then at
time k
Ωk = RkRk-1...R1Ω0.   (14)
The interesting correlates of individual or collective con-
sciousness are, in this development, now represented by an
information-theoretic path defined by the sequence of operators
Rk, each member having m2 components. The grammar
and syntax of the path defined by these operators is asso-
ciated with a dual information source, in the usual man-
ner.
The effect of an information source of external signals, Y,
is now seen in terms of more complex joint paths in Y and
R-space whose behavior is, again, governed by a mutual
information splitting criterion according to the JAEPT.
The complex sequence in m2-dimensional R-space has, by
this construction, been projected down onto a parallel
path, the smaller set of m-dimensional ω-parameter vec-
tors Ω0, ..., Ωk.
If the punctuated tuning of institutional attention is now
characterized by a 'higher' dual information source – an
embedding generalized language -so that the paths of the
operators Rk are autocorrelated, then the autocorrelated
paths in Ωk represent output of a parallel information
source which is, given Rate Distortion limitations, appar-
ently a grossly simplified, and hence highly distorted, pic-
ture of the process represented by the R-operators, having
m as opposed to m × m components.
High levels of distortion may not necessarily be the case
for such a structure, provided it is properly tuned to the incom-
ing signal. If it is inappropriately tuned, however, then dis-
tortion may be extraordinary.
The next step is to examine a single iteration in detail,
assuming now there is a (tunable) zero reference state, R0,
for the sequence of operators Rk, and that
Ωk+1 = (R0 + δRk+1)Ωk,    (15)
where δRk is small in some sense compared to R0.
Note that in this analysis the operators Rk are, implicitly,
determined by linear regression. It is thus possible to
invoke a quasi-diagonalization in terms of R0. Let Q be
the matrix of eigenvectors which Jordan-block-diagonal-
izes R0. Then
QΩk+1 = (QR0Q-1 + QδRk+1Q-1)QΩk.   (16)
If QΩk is an eigenvector of R0, say Yj with eigenvalue λj, it
is possible to rewrite this equation as a generalized spec-
tral expansion
J is a block-diagonal matrix, δJk+1 ≡ QRk+1Q-1, and δYk+1
has been expanded in terms of a spectrum of the eigenvectors of
R0, with
|ai| <<> |λj|, |ai+1| <<> |ai|.   (18)
The point is that, provided R0 has been tuned so that this
condition is true, the first few terms in the spectrum of this
iteration of the eigenstate will contain most of the essen-
tial information about δRk+1. This appears quite similar to
the detection of color in the retina, where three overlap-
ping non-orthogonal eigenmodes of response are suffi-
cient to characterize a huge plethora of color sensation.
Here, if such a tuned spectral expansion is possible, a very
small number of observed eigenmodes would suffice to
permit identification of a vast range of changes, so that the
rate-distortion constraints become quite modest. That is,
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paths in R-space to paths in Ω-space. Inappropriate tun-
ing, however, can produce very marked distortion, even
institutional inattentional blindness, in spite of multitask-
ing.
Wallace [14] describes the individual case as follows:
"Conscious attention acts through a Rate Distortion man-
ifold, a kind of retina-like filter for grammatical and syn-
tactical meaningful paths, which affects what can be
brought to consciousness in a punctuated manner akin to
a phase transition. Signals outside the topologically con-
strained tunable syntax/grammar bandpass of this mani-
fold are subject to lessened probability of punctuated
conscious detection: generalized [inattentional blind-
ness]."
Note that higher order Rate Distortion Manifolds are
likely to give better approximations than lower ones, in
the same sense that second order tangent structures give
better, if more complicated, approximations in conven-
tional differentiable manifolds (e.g. [58]). Nonetheless,
inattentional blindness remains a canonical failure mode
for all individually or collectively conscious systems,
although it may be lessened in the latter case if individual
workspaces are sufficiently numerous and diverse – mul-
tiple, significantly different R0's – and are able to cross-
communicate with little distortion.
Indeed, Rate Distortion Manifolds can be quite formally
described using standard techniques from topological
manifold theory [15]. The essential point is that a rate dis-
tortion manifold is a topological structure which con-
strains the 'stream of institutional collective
consciousness' as well as the pattern of communication
between institutional giant components, much the way a
riverbank constrains the flow of the river it contains. This
is a fundamental insight, which we pursue further.
10. Institutional resilience
The groupoid treatment of modular cognitive networks
above defined equivalence classes of states according to
whether they could be linked to some origin by grammat-
ical/syntactical high probability meaningful paths, and
equivalence classes of languages according to their empiri-
cally-characterized dynamical properties. One can ask the
precisely complementary question regarding paths within
a given dynamic manifold: For any two particular given
states, is there some sense in which it is possible to define
equivalence classes across the set of meaningful paths
linking them? This will give rise to the fundamental topo-
logical groupoid of a particular cognitive dynamic mani-
fold.
This is of particular interest to the second order hierarchi-
cal model which, in effect, describes a universality class
tuning of the renormalization parameters characterizing
the dancing, flowing, tunably punctuated accession to
individual or collective consciousness.
A closely similar question is central to recent algebraic
geometry approaches to concurrent, i.e. highly parallel,
computing (e.g. [59-61]), which we adapt.
For the moment restrict attention to a giant component
system characterized by two renormalization parameters,
say ω1 and ω2 and consider the set of meaningful paths
connecting two particular points, say a and b, in the two
dimensional ω-space plane of figure 3. The arguments sur-
rounding equations (6), (7) and (12) suggests that there
may be regions of fatal attraction and strong repulsion,
Black holes and White holes, which can either trap or
deflect the path of institutional cognition.
Figures 3a and 3b show two possible configurations for a
Black and a White hole, diagonal and cross-diagonal. If
one requires path monotonicity – always increasing or
remaining the same – then, following, [61], figs. 6, 7,
there are, intuitively, two direct ways, without switch-
backs, that one can get from a to b in the diagonal geom-
etry of figure 3a, without crossing a Black or White hole,
but there are three in the cross-diagonal structure of figure
3b.
Elements of each 'way' can be transformed into each other
by continuous deformation without crossing either the
Black or White hole. Figure 3a has two additional possible
monotonic ways, involving over/under switchbacks,
which are not drawn. Relaxing the monotonicity require-
ment generates a plethora of other possibilities, e.g. loop-
ings and backwards switchbacks, but it is not clear under
what circumstances such complex paths can be meaning-
ful.
These ways are the equivalence classes generating the fun-
damental topological groupoid of the two different ω-
spaces, analogs to the fundamental homotopy groups in
spaces which admit of loops (e.g. [62]). The closed loops
needed for classical homotopy theory are impossible for
this kind of system because of the 'flow of time' defining
the output of an information source -one goes from a to
b, although, for nonmonotonic paths, intermediate loop-
ing would seem possible. The theory is thus one of
directed homotopy, dihomotopy, and the central ques-
tion revolves around the continuous deformation of paths
in ω-space into one another, without crossing Black or
White holes. Goubault and Rausssen [60] provide another
introduction to the formalism.Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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a. Diagonal Black and White holes in the two dimensional plane Figure 3
a. Diagonal Black and White holes in the two dimensional ω-plane. Only two direct paths can link points a and b which are 
continuously deformable into one another without crossing either hole. There are two additional monotonic switchback paths 
which are not drawn. Equivalence classes of paths define the fundamental dihomotopy groupoid. b. Cross-diagonal Black and 
White holes as in 3a. Three direct equivalence classes of continuously deformable paths can link a and b. Thus the two spaces 
are topologically distinct, having different dihomotopy groupoids. Here monotonic switchbacks are not possible, although 
relaxation of that condition can lead to 'backwards' switchbacks and intermediate loopings.Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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These ideas can, of course, be applied to lower level cog-
nitive modules as well as to the second order hierarchical
cognitive model of institutional cognition where they are,
perhaps, of more central interest.
Empirical study will likely show how the influence of cul-
tural heritage or developmental history defines quite dif-
ferent dihomotopies of attentional focus in human
organizations. That is, the topology of blind spots and
their associated patterns of perceptual completion in
human organizations will be culturally or developmen-
tally modulated. It is this developmental cultural topol-
ogy of multitasking organization attention which, acting
in concert with the inherent limitations of the rate distor-
tion manifold, generates the pattern of organizational
inattentional blindness.
Such considerations, and indeed the Black Hole develop-
ment of equation (12), suggest that a multitasking organ-
ization which becomes trapped in a particular pattern of
behavior cannot, in general, expect to emerge from it in
the absence of some forcing mechanism.
This form of behavior is central to ecosystem resilience
theory, which we will examine at two different scales. The
first is at the topology of an individual dynamic manifold.
The second emerges when the dynamical groupoid is bro-
ken by hierarchical linkages which patch together differ-
ent manifolds. These may, in fact, simply represent
different scales of the same basic phenomenon, i.e. a
patching of spaces.
Ecosystem theorists, in fact, recognize several different
kinds of resilience (e.g. [63]). The first, which they call
'engineering resilience', since it is particularly characteris-
tic of machines and man-machine interactions, involves
the rate at which a disturbed system returns to a presumed
single, stable, equilibrium condition, following perturba-
tion. From that limited perspective, a resilient system is
one which quickly returns to its one stable state.
Not many biological or social phenomena seem resilient
in this simplistic sense.
Holling's [64] particular contribution was to recognize
that sudden transitions between different, at best quasi-
stable, domains of relation among ecosystem variates
were possible, i.e. that more than one 'stable' state was
possible for real ecosystems. Gunderson [63] puts the
matter as follows:
"One key distinction between these two types of resilience
lies in assumptions regarding the existence of multiple
[quasi-] stable states. If it is assumed that only one stable
state exists or can be designed to exist, then the only pos-
sible definition and measures for resilience are near equi-
librium ones – such as characteristic return time... The
concept of ecological resilience presumes the existence of
multiple stability domains and the tolerance of the system
to perturbations that facilitate transitions among stable
states. Hence, ecological resilience refers to the width or
limit of a stability domain and is defined by the magni-
tude of disturbance that a system can absorb before it
changes stable states... The presence of multiple [quasi-]
stable states and transitions among them [has] been
[empirically] described in a [large] range of ecological sys-
tems..."
The topology of institutional cognition provides a tool for
study of resilience in human organizations or social sys-
tems. The obvious conjecture is that the set of equivalence
classes of directed homotopy described above formally
classifies quasi-equilibrium states, and thus characterizes
the different possible ecosystem resilience modes by their
fundamental topological groupoids within a particular
dynamic manifold. However, a shift between dynamical
manifolds would represent a qualitatively different kind
of resilience transition.
This approach generalizes some current work on distrib-
uted cognition (e.g. [65]) in that it is not restricted to engi-
neering resilience, i.e. graceful degradation, followed by
return to equilibrium, but encompasses the idea of path-
ological states much like the eutrophication of a pristine
lake. Changes between orders of these quasi-equilibrium
states, in our model, require more than simply the lessen-
ing of challenge, but positive, intensive, intervention from
outside the system itself to shift domains of quasi-stabil-
ity.
Ultimately, we are invoking the necessity of 'executive
force' to move organizations between different modes,
either within one, or between, dynamic manifolds. If
there is a insufficient repertory of possibilities, or insuffi-
cient ability to cause transition, then 'market forces' may
be literally devastating, as was the experience of the
Columbia space shuttle disaster [66].
Later we will be concerned with the impact of widespread
collective stress – disaster – on institutional resilience, but
some further analytic machinery is needed.
11. Irreversible variation and selection
Collective consciousness can, then, occur across a great
variety of institutions, which themselves are culturally
constrained, and will persist even as underlying structures
may shift. Within an evolutionary setting this would be
equivalent to polyphyletic parallelism, where many differ-
ent responses to similar selection pressures produce simi-
lar functional outcomes – for example bird, bat, andTheoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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insect wings all used for flight. Institutional economics, in
fact, takes an explicitly evolutionary view of these matters,
(e.g. [67]), abandoning an equilibrium perspective for
developmental irreversibility.
Selection pressures write distorted images of themselves
onto genetic structure through natural selection [53]. Wal-
lace and Wallace [68,69], in fact, argued that, due to its
highly structured nature, an embedding environment
constitutes an information source which, as it becomes
more closely linked to an organism – as the organism's
homeostatic elasticity fails – writes its distorted genetic
image as a phase transition, accounting directly for punc-
tuated equilibrium in the fossil record. Analogs with eco-
logical or institutional resilience seem clear.
The essence of evolutionary process, then, is the punctu-
ated occurrence of major innovations in structure and
function, which then develop according to an irreversible
bush-like branching, that is then pruned by some combi-
nation of selection pressure and blind chance. One exam-
ple is the many mainframe computer companies which
flowered and failed, leaving IBM as the principal legacy.
Mainframes now face extinction. Another is the many per-
sonal computer operating systems that collapsed, leaving
Microsoft's version, which itself now faces strong selection
pressure and possible extinction.
Thus the various forms of collectively  conscious institu-
tions all encounter 'market' selection pressures and the
vicissitudes of chance, and engage in variation through
learning and random change, providing another example
of irreversible evolutionary process. Selection pressures –
market demands -will write images of themselves onto
collectively conscious institutions, which must then
homeostatically adjust, structurally adapt, or fail. D. Wal-
lace and R. Wallace [70], for example, provide an explicit
evolutionary perspective on how the 'South Bronx' proc-
ess of policy-driven contagious urban decay constituted a
draconian selection pressure for social network structure,
the basic skeleton upon which any local collectively con-
scious institution must be built.
Collectively conscious institutions, then, are subject to
irreversible evolutionary development, constrained by the
intertwining of cultural and historical context which limit
adaptability and may well predispose them to characteris-
tic failure modes, which we now explore in more detail.
Pathologies of individual consciousness
Some insight regarding failure modes in collectively con-
scious institutions can be gained from the study of pathol-
ogies in a system having but a single broadcast workspace,
i.e. the human mind [12]. The result is not at all reassur-
ing.
Mental disorders in humans are not well understood.
Indeed, such classifications as the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders – fourth edition, [71], the stand-
ard descriptive nosology in the US, have been character-
ized as prescientific by Gilbert [72] and others. Arguments
from genetic determinism fail, in part because of an
apparently draconian population bottleneck which, early
in our species' history, resulted in an overall genetic diver-
sity less than that observed within and between contem-
porary chimpanzee subgroups. Arguments from
psychosocial stress fare better, but are affected by the
apparently complex and contingent developmental paths
determining the onset of schizophrenia – one of the most
prevalent serious mental disorders – dementias, psycho-
ses, and so forth, some of which may be triggered in utero
by exposure to infection, low birthweight, or other stres-
sors.
Gilbert suggests an extended evolutionary perspective, in
which evolved mechanisms like the 'flight-or-fight'
response are inappropriately excited or suppressed, result-
ing in such conditions as anxiety or post traumatic stress
disorders. Nesse [73] suggests that depression may repre-
sent the dysfunction of an evolutionary adaptation which
down-regulates foraging activity in the face of unattaina-
ble goals.
Kleinman and Good, however, ([74], p. 492) have out-
lined some of the cross cultural subtleties affecting the
study of depression which seem to argue against any sim-
ple evolutionary interpretation:
"When culture is treated as a constant (as is common
when studies are conducted in our own society), it is rela-
tively easy to view depression as a biological disorder, trig-
gered by social stressors in the presence of ineffective
support, and reflected in a set of symptoms or complaints
that map back onto the biological substrate of the disor-
der... However, when culture is treated as a significant var-
iable, for example, when the researcher seriously
confronts the world of meaning and experience of mem-
bers of non-Western societies, many of our assumptions
about the nature of emotions and illness are cast in sharp
relief. Dramatic differences are found across cultures in
the social organization, personal experience, and conse-
quences of such emotions as sadness, grief, and anger, of
behaviors such as withdrawal or aggression, and of psy-
chological characteristics such as passivity and helpless-
ness or the resort to altered states of consciousness. They
are organized differently as psychological realities, com-
municated in a wide range of idioms, related to quite var-
ied local contexts of power relations, and are interpreted,
evaluated, and responded to as fundamentally different
meaningful realities... Depressive illness and dysphoria
are thus not only interpreted differently in non-WesternTheoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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societies and across cultures; they are constituted as funda-
mentally different forms of social reality."
More generally, Kleinman and Cohen [75] find that
"[S]everal myths... have become central to psychiatry...
The first is that the forms of mental illness everywhere dis-
play similar degrees of prevalence... [Second is] an exces-
sive adherence to a principle known as the pathogenic/
pathoplastic dichotomy, which holds that biology is
responsible for the underlying structure of a malaise,
whereas cultural beliefs shape the specific ways in which a
person experiences it. The third myth maintains that vari-
ous unusual culture-specific disorders whose biological
bases are uncertain occur only in exotic places outside the
West... In an effort to base psychiatry in 'hard' science and
thus raise its status to that of other medical disciplines,
psychiatrists have narrowly focused on the biological
underpinnings of mental disorders while discounting the
importance of such 'soft' variables as culture and socioe-
conomic status..."
Further, serious mental disorders in humans are often
comorbid among themselves – depression and anxiety,
compulsive behaviors, psychotic ideation, etc. – and with
serious chronic physical conditions such as coronary heart
disease, atherosclerosis, diabetes, hypertension, dyslipi-
demia, and so on. These too are increasingly recognized as
developmental in nature (e.g. [11]), and are frequently
compounded by behavioral problems like violence or
substance use and abuse. Indeed, smoking, alcohol and
drug addiction, compulsive eating, and the like, are often
done as self-medication for the impacts of psychosocial
and other stressors, constituting socially-induced 'risk
behaviors' which synergistically accelerate a broad spec-
trum of mental and physical problems.
Recent research on schizophrenia, dyslexia, and autism,
supports a 'brain connectivity' model for these disorders
which is of considerable interest from a global workspace
perspective, since large-scale brain connectivity is essen-
tial for the operation of consciousness, a principal, and
very old, evolutionary adaptation in higher animals.
Burns et al. [76], on the basis of sophisticated diffusion
tensor magnetic resonance imaging studies, find that
schizophrenia is a disorder of large-scale neurocognitive
networks rather than specific regions, and that pathologi-
cal changes in the disorder should be sought at the supra-
regional level. Both structural and functional abnormali-
ties in frontoparietal networks have been described and
may constitute a basis for the wide range of cognitive
functions impaired in the disorder, such as selective atten-
tion, language processing and attribution of agency.
Silani et al. [77] find that, for dyslexia, altered activation
observed within the reading system is associated with
altered density of grey and white matter of specific brain
regions, such as the left middle and inferior temporal gyri
and left arcuate fasciculus. This supports the view that dys-
lexia is associated with both local grey matter dysfunction
and with altered [larger scale] connectivity among phono-
logical/reading areas.
Villalobos et al. [78] explore the hypothesis that large-
scale abnormalities of the dorsal stream and possibly the
mirror neuron system, may be responsible for impair-
ments of joint attention, imitation, and secondarily for
language delays in autism. Their empirical study showed
that those with autism had significantly reduced connec-
tivity with bilateral inferior frontal area 44, which is com-
patible with the hypothesis of mirror neuron defects in
autism. More generally, their results suggest that dorsal
stream connectivity in autism may not be fully functional.
Courchesne and Pierce [79] suggest that, for autism, con-
nectivity within the frontal lobe is excessive, disorganized,
and inadequately selective, whereas connectivity between
frontal cortex and other systems is poorly synchronized,
weakly responsive and information impoverished.
Increased local but reduced long-distance cortical-cortical
reciprocal activity and coupling would impair the funda-
mental frontal function of integrating information from
widespread and diverse systems and providing complex
context-rich feedback, guidance and control to lower-level
systems.
Coplan [80] has observed a striking pattern of excessive
frontal lobe self-connectivity in certain cases of anxiety
disorder, and Coplan et al. [81] find that maternal stress
can affect long-term hippocampal neurodevelopment in a
primate model.
As stated, brain connectivity is the sine qua non of the
Global Workspace model of individual human conscious-
ness, and further analysis suggests that these disorders
cannot be fully understood in the absence of a functional
theory of consciousness, and in particular, of a detailed
understanding of the elaborate regulatory mechanisms
which must have evolved over the past half billion years
to ensure the stability of that most central and most pow-
erful of adaptations.
Distortion of consciousness is not simply an epiphenom-
enon of the emotional dysregulation which many see as
the 'real' cause of mental disorder. Like the pervasive
effects of culture, distortion of consciousness lies at the
heart of both the individual experience of mental disorder
and the effect of it on the embedding of the individual
within both social relationships and cultural or environ-Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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mental milieu. Distortion of consciousness in mental dis-
orders inhibits both routine social interaction and the
ability to meet internalized or expected cultural norms, a
potentially destabilizing positive feedback. Distortion of
consciousness profoundly affects the ability to learn new,
or change old, skills in the face of changing patterns of
threat or opportunity, perhaps the most critical purpose of
the adaptation itself. Distortion of consciousness, particu-
larly any decoupling from social and cultural context, is
usually a threat to long-term individual survival, and
those with mental disorders significantly affecting con-
sciousness typically face shortened lifespans.
Pathologies of collective consciousness
Human communities, as natural as neighborhoods, or as
intentional as a multinational corporation or an army,
have, according to the perspective of this work, multiple,
effectively simultaneous, global broadcast giant compo-
nents which must not only function individually, but in
concert with, while perhaps in competition for resources
with, other similar modules.
Granovetter's [41] Strength of Weak Ties argument is that
nondisjunctive relationships, those which do not dis-
jointly partition a community, are essential for efficient
function. Strong ties are those which do disjointly parti-
tion a group, for example religious affiliation, age cohort,
ethnicity, national origin, skin color in some cases, lan-
guage, and so on. For an institutional setting these might
be the classification by Division, Department, Work
Group, informal office-politics clique, and so on. From
the perspective of GWT, Granovetter's weak ties permit
both the formation of individual workspaces, and enable
those workspaces to communicate effectively.
Understanding failures within and between institutional
global workspaces seems predicated on understanding
weak tie structure and dynamics, which are themselves
embedded in larger social and cultural contexts. Clearly,
individual workspace failures will often be subject to
monitoring and control by parallel workspaces, limiting
the damage, as it were, in a manner impossible for human
consciousness. Thus institutions, if of sufficient internal
diversity and able to communicate effectively across that
diversity, may suffer less inattentional blindness and less
consequence from individual workspace failure, by virtue
of parallel operations, but these problems will not be
eliminated. Powerful subgroups not subject to contextual
constraint seem a particular problem.
Within organizations, several workspaces typically exam-
ine a problem, choose possible modes of action, and,
essentially, negotiate and reach consensus. If there is a suf-
ficient spectrum of workspace foci – multiple, different
R0's – and if cross communication between them is not
too distorted, a 'good' institutional decision usually
emerges.
This is not, however, always the case, and the approach of
equations (6) and (7) and their generalization can be used
to model some of the myriad possibilities, in particular
institutional 'lock-in' to bad procedures, where the system
seems to disappear down a black hole, or, conversely,
avoids the eight hundred pound gorilla in the livingroom,
as it were.
Suppose we can operationalize and quantify degrees of
both institutional inattentional blindness (IAB) and of
Rate Distortion (RD) in communication between differ-
ent institutional global workspaces. This might be done
through surveys, structured interviews, statistical charac-
terization of internal telephone patterns, email logs, or
the like. The essential assumption is that the dual infor-
mation source of a collectively conscious institution
which has low levels of both IAB and RD will tend to be
richer than that of institutions having greater levels. This
is shown in figure 4a, where H is the source uncertainty, X
= IAB, and Y = RD. Regions of low X, Y, i.e. near the origin,
have greater source uncertainty than those nearby, so H
(X, Y) shows a (relatively gentle) peak at the origin, taken
as the product of two error functions. The generalized
Onsager argument of equations 6–12 is shown in figure
4b, where S = H (X, Y) - XdH/dX - YdH/dY is graphed on
the Z axis against the X - Y plane, assuming a gentle peak
in H at the origin. Peaks in S, according to the arguments
of equations 6–12, constitute repulsive system barriers,
which must be overcome by external forces. In figure 4b
there are three quasi-stable resilience modes, marked as A,
B, and C. The A region is locked in to low levels of both
inattentional blindness and rate distortion, as it sits in a
pocket. Forcing the system in either direction, that is,
increasing either IAB or RD, will, initially, be met by
homeostatic attempts to return to the resilience state A,
according to this model.
If, in particular, rate distortion problems become severe in
spite of homeostatic mechanisms, the system will then
jump to the quasi-stable state B, a second pocket. Accord-
ing to the model, however, once that transition takes
place, there will be a tendency for the system to remain in
a condition of high rate distortion as a matter of institu-
tionalized continued practice. That is, the system will,
according to the model, become locked-in to a structure
with high distortion in communication between institu-
tional global workspaces, but one having lower overall
collective conscious capacity, i.e. a lower value of H in fig-
ure 4a.
The third pocket, marked C, is a broad plain in which both
IAB and RD remain high, a highly overfocused, poorlyTheoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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crosslinked, probably pathologically hierarchical, struc-
ture which will require significant intervention to alter
once it reaches such a quasi-stable resilience mode. Col-
lective conscious capacity, measured by H in figure 4a, is
the lowest of all for this condition of pathological resil-
ience, and attempts to correct the problem – to return to
condition  A, will be met with very high barriers in S,
according to figure 4b. That is, mode C is very highly resil-
ient, although pathologically so, much like the eutrophi-
cation of a pure lake by sewage outflow.
We can argue that the three quasi-equilibrium configura-
tions of figure 4b represent different dynamical manifolds
of the system, and that the possibility of transition
between them represents the breaking of the associated
symmetry groupoid by external forcing mechanisms. That
is, three differentiable manifolds representing three differ-
ent kinds of system dynamics have been patched together
by the force of some external executive to create a more
complicated topological structure. For cognitive phenom-
ena, this kind of thing is likely to be the rule rather than
a. Source uncertainty, H, of the dual information source of institutional collective consciousness, as parametized by degrees of  inattentional blindness, X = IAB and rate distortion Y = RD Figure 4
a. Source uncertainty, H, of the dual information source of institutional collective consciousness, as parametized by degrees of 
inattentional blindness, X = IAB and rate distortion Y = RD. Note the relatively gentle peak at low values of X, Y. H is generated 
as the product of two error functions. b. Generalized Onsager treatment of figure 4a. S = H (X, Y) - XdH/dX - YdH/dY. The 
regions marked A, B, and C represent realms of resilient quasi-stablity, divided by barriers defined by the relative peaks in S. 
Transition among them requires a forcing mechanism. From another perspective, limiting resources or imposing social disinte-
gration from the outside – driving down H in figure 4a, would drive the system to the lower plain of C, in which the system 
would then become trapped in states having high levels of rate distortion and inattentional blindness.Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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the exception. 'Pure' groupoids are likely to be arbitrary
abstractions, and the fundamental questions will involve
the systems of linkages which break the underlying sym-
metry.
Matters are, unfortunately, much more complicated than
even this example. Figure 5 shows a three dimensional
version of the X - Y base plane of figures 4a and 4b. Here
we assume that the richness of institutional collective con-
sciousness, as measured by its dual information source, is
a function of three parameters, X = IAB, and Y = RD as
before, but now introduce a third parameter, Z = PI, where
PI represents the degree to which the institution is driven,
not by adaptation to externalities, but by fixed internal
policy and/or ideology. The assumption is, again, that
institutions less constrained by such factors will be more
flexible and have 'richer' cognitive dual information
sources. Thus we could again write H (X, Y, Z), S = H -
XdH/dX - YdH/dY - ZdH/dZ with H 'denser' toward the ori-
gin of figure 5, i.e. near the of lowest X, Y, Z where H has
been modeled as the product of three error functions, gen-
eralizing figure 4. Quite a large number of quasi-stable
resilience modes can result from simple variations of this
model, but they cannot, unfortunately, be easily repre-
sented in three dimensions.
The variates PI, IAB, and RD have been represented as
orthogonal in figures 4 and 5. For real systems, however,
related empirical indices are not likely to be independent,
so that proper analysis would require application of mul-
tivariate statistical methods to produce actual orthogonal
measures.
Note that attaining low levels of PI, IAB, and RD in this
model requires very high levels of H, that is, considerable
richness of the dual information source of institutional
collective consciousness.
Thus one mechanism likely to impose pathologies of IAB,
RD, or PI on a collectively conscious institution would be
severe resource limitation. Recall the homology between
information source uncertainty and free energy density,
equation (5). The dual information source representing a
multiple workspace, collectively conscious institution
measures, in one broad sense, available 'energy'. Limited
resources will impose limits on the possible magnitude of
that information source. Constraints on H generate struc-
tures much like the outer shell of figure 5: H < 0.1 gener-
ates a system with high rates of the three pathologies.
More formally, one might apply Lagrange multiplier or
other quantitative constraint/optimization strategies.
A second perspective to limits on H, and hence to the
imposition of constraints due to RD, IAB, or PI, is derived
entirely from communication theory. If one imagines the
possibilities for information transmission within the
institution to be limited by a maximum channel capacity
C, which may well be, but is not necessarily, resource-
related, then classical information theory [33-35] requires
that the dual information source transmitting along the
channel must satisfy the relation
H(X, Y, Z) ≤ C.
Invoking the homology with free energy density, again,
heuristically speaking, an institution cannot 'spend
energy' at a rate greater than some limiting value C, which
is the (effective) channel capacity of that institution. Insti-
tutions embedded in socially disintegrating subcultures,
even if they 'objectively' have resources comparable to
similar institutions in more integrated subcultures, will
not be able to operate at cognitive rates greater than their
channel capacity C, which is, effectively, the image of
imposed cultural or other constraints.
Thus socially disintegrated subcultures will likely impose
capacity limits on embedded collectively conscious insti-
tutions which will express themselves as institutional
pathologies of rate distortion, inattentional blindness, or
rigid policy/ideology, even when given supposedly ade-
quate resources. That is, both embedding social disinte-
gration and limited resources act, effectively, to dumb-
down collectively conscious institutions, according to this
model.
From an inverse perspective, resource limitation/competi-
tion and embedding social disintegration can act synergis-
tically to limit the richness of institutional collective
consciousness, thus imposing constraints of rate distor-
tion, inattentional blindness, or policy/ideology on the
ability of the organization to recognize patterns of threat
or opportunity. That is, imposing limits on maximum H
in figures 4a or 5 drives the system into the dumbed-
down, locked-in realms of S – states B and C and their
generalization to higher dimension. Thus, within
oppressed communities, IAB, RD, and PI can sometimes
be viewed as responses of institutional triage to social dis-
integration and/or resource competition/limitation.
Within oppressor social structures, however, mechanisms
of pathological resilience may simply dominate: Apart-
heid systems can defend themselves.
An important implication of this analysis is that signifi-
cant collectively experienced adverse events – disasters –
which either constrain resources or degrade underlying
social communication channels, can trigger shifts in eco-
system resilience domain leading to broad-scale, locked-
in, patterns of institutional pathology across an entire
community. These may be a change in mode within a sin-
gle dynamic manifold, or, if the disaster is severe enough,Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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Extension of figure 4a, using the product of three error functions Figure 5
Extension of figure 4a, using the product of three error functions. Assume, now, three characteristic parameters, X = IAB and 
Y = RD as above, with Z = PI representing the degree of policy/ideological rigidity. Again, the fundamental assumption is that H 
(X, Y, Z) will have a (gentle) peak near the origin. Then S = H (X, Y, Z) - XdH/dX - YdH/dY - ZdH/dZ has a very complicated sys-
tem of quasi-stable, locked-in, resilience modes. Again transition between them would require external forcing. Note particu-
larly the nested surfaces with different values of H. Attaining low levels of IAB, RD, and PI requires high values of H, which, in 
turn, requires high internal channel capacity, i.e. low social disintegration, and, broadly speaking, high use of energy resources. 
Institutions suffering social disintegration or resource limitation will be confined to the outer shells, and will experience high 
levels of pathology. Note that low internal channel capacity – high structural rate distortion within the organization – can, in 
this model, make it virtually impossible to use even available resources effectively.Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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represent a full-scale shift between manifolds. Recovery
from disaster-induced institutional pathology, as the next
section shows, may be compromised by the very events or
forces which caused the disaster.
Pathologies of therapeutic intervention
Persistent failure by an individual workspace, or a partic-
ular subset of them, the effects of inattentional blindness,
or pathologies of rate distorted intraworkspace communi-
cation, or of policy and ideology, can, in theory, be
addressed by external correction, therapeutic intervention
by other entities, i.e. the interventionist 'Deus ex
Machina'. Pathological context, which is often responsi-
ble for global workspace failures of various kinds, can,
however, become convoluted with the intervention itself,
resulting in therapeutic failure. It is possible to model this
in more detail.
Recall that the essential characteristic of cognition in this
formalism involves a mapping, h(x), of a (convolutional)
path x = a0, a1, ..., an, ... onto a member of one of two dis-
joint sets, B0 or B1. Thus respectively, either (1) h(x) ∈ B0,
implying no action taken, or (2), h(x) ∈ B1, and some par-
ticular response is chosen from a large repertoire of possi-
ble responses. There is an evident problem in defining
these two disjoint sets, suggesting that some higher order,
i.e. executive, cognitive module is needed to determine
what constitutes B0, the set of normal actions and proce-
dures, those not constituting explicit intervention. Again,
this is because there is no low energy mode for informa-
tion systems. That is, virtually all states are more or less
high energy, high information content or transmission,
states. Thus there is no natural way to identify a ground
state using the physicist's favorite variational or other
minimization arguments.
Suppose that higher order executive cognitive module,
which can be described as a kind of Zero Mode Identifica-
tion, interacts with an embedding, highly structured
quasi-language of systemic perturbation – market forces
and failures, disasters, structured noise, and the like.
Instantiating a Rate Distortion image of that embedding
stress, the ZMI begins to map one or more members of the
set B1 into the set B0, or vice versa, when a circumstance
requiring action is ignored. Recurrent hits on that aberrant
state would be experienced as episodes of institutional
pathology, over or under reaction.
Empirical tests of this hypothesis quickly involve real-
world regression models of the interrelations among
measurable markers of success and failure, leading to the
Rate Distortion Manifold arguments above.
Different eigenmodes Yk of the RDM regression model
characterized by the zero mode matrix R0 can be taken to
represent the shifting-of-gears between different lan-
guages defining the sets B0 and B1. That is, different eigen-
modes of the RDM would correspond to different
required (and possibly mixed) characteristic systemic
responses.
If there is a state (or set of states) Y1 such that R0Y1 = Y1,
then the unitary kernel Y1 corresponds to the condition
'no response required', i.e. the set B0.
Suppose pathology becomes manifest, i.e.
R0 → R0 + δR ≡  0,
so that some chronic 'excited state' becomes the new uni-
tary kernel, and
Y1 →  1 ≠ Y1
Next, assume other, perhaps embedding, corporate global
workspaces induce a sequence of therapeutic counterper-
turbations – deliberate therapeutic interventions – δTk
according to the pattern
and so on, iteratively, so that, in some sense,
Yj → Y1.   (20)
That is, the system, as monitored by the RDM, is driven to
its original condition.
It may or may not be possible to have  0 → R0. That is,
actual remediation may not be possible, in which case
palliation or control is the therapeutic aim.
The essential point is that the pathological state repre-
sented by  0 and the sequence of therapeutic interven-
tions  δTk,  k  = 1, 2,... are interactive and reflective,
depending on the regression of the set of vectors Yj to the
desired state Y1, much in the same spirit as Jerne's immu-
nological idiotypic hall of mirrors.
The therapeutic problem revolves around minimizing the
difference between Yk and Y1 over the course of treatment.
That difference represents the inextricable convolution of
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treatment failure with adverse reactions to the course of
treatment itself, and failure of compliance, often attrib-
uted through social construction by 'provider' to 'patient',
i.e. failure of the therapeutic alliance.
It should be obvious that the treatment sequence δTk itself
is a cognitive path of interventions which has, in turn, a
dual information source in the sense previously invoked.
Treatment may, then, interact in the usual Rate Distortion
manner with the pathogenic patterns of structured pertur-
bation – market pressures, failures, disasters, resource lim-
itations, embedding channel capacity limits, structured
'red' noise, the burdens of history, and the like – which
are, themselves, signals from an embedding information
source. Thus treatment failure, adverse reactions, and
noncompliance will, of necessity, embody a distorted
image of embedding structured perturbations which may
indeed be responsible for the primary misfunction.
This coupling would most likely occur in a highly punctu-
ated manner, depending in a quantitative way on the
degree of interlinking of the threefold system of affected
workgroups, therapeutic interaction, and treatment
mode, with that perturbation.
Clearly this is only one example of a much larger spectrum
of possibilities. Empirical study would seem necessary at
this point to prune down the search tree, as it were, mak-
ing further analysis practical.
One disturbing implication of this analysis is the apparent
difficulty of correcting institutional collective conscious-
ness once it becomes overtly pathological. The general
experience of greatly shortened lifespan for most individ-
uals suffering developmental pathologies of global work-
space connectivity – schizophrenia, dementia, autism,
and the like – suggests that the relentless impact of market
forces, which are effectively evolutionary selection pres-
sures, guarantees rapid extinction or merger as the most
likely outcome for any systematic, large-scale, organiza-
tional cognitive lapses. Western market economies are lit-
tered with the corpses of extinct enterprises and economic
taxa, and the last century has not been kind to states which
possessed, or attempted to gain, colonial empires of vari-
ous forms, nor to the regions and peoples which suffered
occupation under colonial regimes [80,81].
In particular, contexts of social disintegration and
resource limitation, individually and likely synergistically,
severely limit the possibilities of therapeutic intervention




The groupoid defined by an institution's inherent cogni-
tive modular structure can be broken by intrusion of
(rapid) crosstalk from within, and by the imposition of
(slower) crosstalk from without – market forces and the
embedding culture. The former initiates a set of topologi-
cally-determined giant component global broadcasts, in a
punctuated manner, while the latter deform the underly-
ing topology of the entire system, the directed homotopy
limiting what paths can actually be traversed within a
given dynamical manifold. Broken symmetry creates
richer phenomena in systems characterized by groupoids,
just as it does for those characterized by groups.
Dynamic behavior is similarly characterized by a set of
manifolds defining another groupoid whose broken sym-
metry can patch together even more complex topological
structures representing quasi-equilibrium resilience con-
ditions, some of which, like the eutrophication of a pris-
tine lake, will be both highly stable and highly
pathological. Transitions between elements of this larger
entity represent a different kind of resilience than the tran-
sition between topological modes characterizing an indi-
vidual dynamical manifold.
According to theory, some executive agency is needed to
either change modes within a single, or cause transition
between different, fundamental cognitive dynamic mani-
folds.
Disasters, in particular, may be agents generating wide-
spread and persistent pathologies of collective conscious-
ness across a community.
Glazebrook [15] has suggested that, lurking in the back-
ground of this basic construction, is what Bak et al. [82]
call a groupoid atlas, i.e. an extension of topological man-
ifold theory to groupoid mappings. Also lurking is identi-
fication and exploration of the natural groupoid
convolution algebra which so often marks these structures
(e.g. [36,83]).
Multitasking institutional attention acts through a spec-
trum of Rate Distortion manifolds, retina-like filters for
grammatical and syntactical meaningful paths. Signals
outside the topologically constrained tunable syntax/
grammar bandpass of this spectrum are subject to less-
ened probability of punctuated conscious detection:
organizational inattentional blindness. This would be
seriously exacerbated by lack of diversity within the set of
global workspaces, and by distortion in the crosstalk
between them. Culture and path-dependent developmen-
tal history will, according to this model, in conjunction
with resource availability and the effects of embeddingTheoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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social disintegration, profoundly affect the phenomenon
by imposing additional topological constraints defining
the 'surface' along which this second order behavior can
(and cannot) glide.
The focus trade-off can be reexpressed in terms of a syntac-
tical/grammatical version of conventional signal theory,
that is, as a tuned meaningful path form of the classic bal-
ance between sensitivity and selectivity, as particularly
constrained by the directed homotopy or pathological
resilience imposed by cultural heritage on a basic institu-
tional experience that is itself the outcome of historical
process.
Implicit, however, are the constraints imposed by embed-
ding cultural heritage and institutional history, which
may hold the system to a develop-mentally, indeed,
Lamarckian evolutionarily, determined topology.
Overall, the analysis is analogous to, but more compli-
cated than, Wallace's version of Baars' Global Workspace
theory [11-14]. Intuitively, one suspects that the higher
the dimension of the second order attentional Rate Dis-
tortion Manifold, that is, the greater the multitasking, the
broader the effective bandwidth of attentional focus, and
the less likely is inattentional blindness if the spectrum of
internal workspaces is sufficiently diverse and well
enough interconnected. For a conventional differentiable
manifold, a second or higher order tangent space would
give a better approximation to the local manifold struc-
ture than a simple plane [58].
Similarly, the highly parallel, multitasking set of global
workspaces which constitute institutional collective con-
sciousness should be less prone to the consequences of
individual workspace failure, provided cross communica-
tion between them is relatively undistorted.
As discussed, however, this may not be the case, and very
complicated patterns of pathological resilience, institu-
tional lock-in, can become established which would
require external intervention for correction. Such thera-
peutic intervention is itself, however, subject to the very
externalities which may have, in fact, created the problem
in the first place.
Conversely, pathological resilience can be induced by dis-
asters which limit resources or impose social disintegra-
tion.
It is possible to introduce the evolutionary selection pres-
sures of market forces into this model, using the approach
of [53], so that internal variation and selection generate
an irreversible path dependent developmental process.
Inattentional blindness, while constrained by multitask-
ing, is not eliminated by it. This suggests that higher order
institutional cognition, the generalization of individual
consciousness, is subject to canonical and idiosyncratic
patterns of failure analogous to, but perhaps more subtle
than, the kind of disorders described in [12,13]. Indeed,
while machines designed along these principles – i.e.
rapid, multitasking Global Workspace devices -could be
spectacularly efficient at many complex tasks, ensuring
their stability might be even more difficult than for intel-
ligent, and hence conscious, machines designed as ana-
logs of the human mind. The relatively slow pace of
institutional collective consciousness may well provide
significant opportunities for self or externally-induced
correction, difficult as that may be in reality, which would
be even more difficult for machines operating in the range
of a few hundred milliseconds.
Further, the necessity of interaction – synchronous or
asynchronous -between institutional giant components
suggests the possibility of failures governed by the Rate
Distortion Theorem. Forcing rapid communication
between institutional global workspaces ensures high lev-
els of average distortion. Recent, and very elegant, ethno-
graphic work by Cohen et al. [84] and Laxmisan et al. [85]
regarding systematic medical error in emergency rooms
focuses particularly on 'handover' problems at shift
change, where incoming medical staff are rapidly briefed
by outgoing staff. Systematic information overload in
such circumstances then becomes routine, and is widely
recognized as a potential error source.
Analogs with mental illness in humans suggest that fail-
ures within individual workspaces, while limited by inter-
actional context, will remain serious sources of overall
institutional failure, particularly when involving power-
ful, higher authority modules or work groups not subject
to peer-level contextual constraint. Therapeutic interven-
tion can itself reflect the very external perturbations caus-
ing individual or large-scale workspace failures.
Institutions suffering significant workspace pathologies,
like similarly afflicted individuals, are likely to face trun-
cated lifespans in the face of market selection pressures,
other relentless externalities, and the deteriorating inter-
nal dynamics of corporate dementia.
The hierarchical cognitive model appropriate to institu-
tional collective consciousness is considerably more com-
plicated than for individual consciousness, which,
perhaps in a tradeoff permitting rapid, accurate, response
to environmental stimulation, seems biologically limited
to a single shifting, tunable giant component broadcast
structure.Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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Shared culture seems to provide far more than merely a
shared language for the establishment of the human
organizations which enable our adaptation to, or altera-
tion of, our varied environments. It also may provide the
stabilizing mechanisms needed to overcome many of the
canonical and idiosyncratic failure modes inherent to
such organizations – inattentional blindness, and pathol-
ogies within, and in communication between, individual
workspaces, as well as the effects of ideological and policy
constraints, and the impact of disasters.
2. Similar approaches
In addition to the seminal work of Hutchins and col-
leagues cited above, there are other analogous perspec-
tives in the literature.
One such is Robert Sampson's 'collective efficacy'
approach to community function [86,87]. A large and
growing body of sociological research, beginning with
Granovetter [41], emphasizes the essential role of nondis-
junctive 'weak' social ties within a community. Collective
efficacy is a recent reworking of the basic idea [87]:
"...[Collective efficacy [means] an emphasis on shared
beliefs in a neighborhood's capability for action to
achieve an intended effect, coupled with an active sense of
engagement on the part of residents. Some density of
social networks is essential... [b]ut the key theoretical
point is that networks have to be activated to be ultimately
meaningful. Collective efficacy therefore helps to elevate
the 'agentic' aspect of social life over a perspective cen-
tered on the accumulation of stocks of [social capital].
This is consistent with a redefinition of social capital in
terms of expectations for action within a collectivity... [in
sum] social networks foster the conditions under which collec-
tive efficacy may flourish, but they are not sufficient for the
exercise of control."
From the viewpoint of our analysis, Sampson invokes a
version of community cognition, the ability of a neigh-
borhood to perceive patterns of threat or opportunity, to
compare those perceived patterns with an internal,
shared, picture of the world, and to choose one or a few
collective actions from a much larger repertory of those
possible, and to carry them out. Disjunctive or 'strong'
social ties define some of the underlying cognitive mod-
ules – collective and individual – within the neighbor-
hood. Weak ties, then, are those which link such modules
– individual or collective – across the community. Indi-
viduals, defined subgroups, or formal organizations, may
have multiple roles within that community, permitting
the formation of multiple global workspaces, if the
strength of the various weak ties linking them is sufficient.
Institutional cognition, in the sense of this work, emerges
as a dynamic, collective phenomenon. Cultural con-
straints and developmental trajectory serve as 'contexts' to
both stabilize and direct the resulting cognitive processes,
which may still fail through inattentional blindness,
resource limitation, or other pathologies including failure
of communication between institutional global work-
spaces.
This is, however, not Sampson's static, cross-sectional,
structure, but, rather, is deeply constrained, not just by
shared culture, but by the path dependent historic devel-
opment of the community itself. Our own work (e.g.
[68,88-93]) demonstrates that 'planned shrinkage', 'urban
renewal', or other disruptions of weak ties akin to ethnic
cleansing, can place neighborhoods onto decades-long
irreversible developmental, perhaps evolutionary, trajec-
tories of social disintegration which short-circuit effective
community cognition. This is, indeed, a fundamental
political purpose of such programs.
There are many other treatments of collective conscious-
ness.
Thomas Burns and his collaborators have, at times,
focused particularly on the role of social process in under-
standing consciousness. Burns and Engdalh [94] write
"What is particularly striking about the academic con-
sciousness industry is the absence of sociology...
A collective has the capacity in its collective representa-
tions and communications about what it can (and can-
not) do, or should do (or should not do). It monitors its
activities, its achievements and failures, and... analyzes
and discusses itself as a defined and developing collective
agent... a collective has potentially a rich basis not only for
talking about, discussing, agreeing (or disagreeing) about
a variety of objects... but it also has a means to conceptu-
alize and develop alternative types of social relationships,
effective forms of leadership, coordination and control,
and... new normative orders and institutional arrange-
ments... These potentialities enable systematic, directed
problem solving, and the generation of variety and com-
plex strategies. In particular selective environments, these
make for major evolutionary advantages...
[However]..[c]ollective representations and reflectivity
and directed problem-solving based on them may prevent
human groups from experiencing or discovering the un-
represented or un-named; unrecognized or poorly defined
problems cannot be dealt with... Reflective and problem-
solving powers may then be distorted, the generation of
alternatives and varieties narrow and largely ineffective,
and social innovation and transformation misdirected
and possibly self-destructive..."Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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Burns and Engdahl [94-96] appear to describe institu-
tional cognition and something much like inattentional
blindness. Our innovation is to propose that the particu-
lar evolutionary advantage of such cognition is its poten-
tial ability to entertain several global workspaces
simultaneously, and thus raise overall action capacity
while reducing, but not eliminating, inattentional blind-
ness, although introducing failures involving miscommu-
nication between institutional global workspaces.
As discussed earlier, a distributed cognition paradigm has
emerged to challenge simple 'mental representation'
models in primate behavior studies. Barrett and Henzi
[97] comment as follows:
"Physiological studies reveal that the blue fin tuna...
should not be able to swim as fast as it actually does. Stud-
ies by fluid dynamicists, however, show that tuna are able
to find naturally occurring currents in the water, and then
use their tails to create additional vortices, which they
exploit for extra propulsion.... [T]he 'real swimming
machine' is not the tuna alone, but the tuna 'in its proper
context' – the tuna, plus the water, plus the vortices it cre-
ates and exploits. As for tuna, so for primates: the real
'social intelligence machine' is the primate acting in its
proper context – its social group. ... [C]ognition is 'situ-
ated' and 'distributed'. Cognition is not limited by the
'skin and skull' of the individual... but uses resources and
materials in the environment in the same way that tuna
use vortices. The dynamic social interactions of primates...
can be investigated as cognitive processes in themselves....
A distributed approach... considers all cognitive processes
to emerge from the interactions between individuals, and
between individuals and their world... Perhaps our great-
est opportunistic and prosocial innovation as group-liv-
ing animals has been to distribute our cognition to an
unprecedented level by storing our essential information
in other minds, instead merely of our own."
As Johnson [98] puts it,
"...[A]... paradigm shift... has been taking place in the
study of human cognition... from models that focus on
internal mental representations to ones that see cognition
as a more distributed process – i.e. a process that occurs
not just within but between individuals... [C]ognition is
expanded from an individual enterprise to a distributed
activity that involves a variety of socio-cultural elements,
including the behavior of multiple individuals, their use
of objects, and their shared histories."
As a reviewer has pointed out, these and the related mod-
els of Hutchins et al. cited above, are, in fact, representa-
tional models in which the representation is itself
distributed.
Patel [99] uses the distributed cognition model to
describe a paradigm shift regarding the role of technology
in medicine:
"The notion of distributed cognition suggests that the
immediate physical and social resources outside the per-
son participate in cognition, not just as a source of input
and a receiver of output, but as a vehicle of thought... the
individual and the environment should be viewed as
dynamically interacting, resulting in cognitive perform-
ance and learning...
Increasingly, researchers have come to characterize cogni-
tion as a distributed process... [I]ntelligence can be seen as
distributed in designed artifacts such as computer-user
interfaces; in representations, such as diagrams; and
through communication in social contexts... The idea of
intelligence (i.e. knowledge and cognition) being distrib-
uted in a group, or in artifacts, customs, and situations, is
interesting because it provides a framework for addressing
a number of theoretical and empirical questions."
As discussed briefly, Patel and colleagues ([84,85] and ref-
erences therein) analyze emergency room process and
function from this perspective, finding what can be inter-
preted as 'rate distortion' error effects at shift change
handover of patients between clinical teams, something
emergency room personnel have characterized as a 'tele-
phone game' [84]. This appears to be a prime example of
a canonical failure mode involving rate-driven, distorted
communication between institutional global workspaces.
Hutchins and collaborators have examined aircraft cock-
pits and naval vessels from similar perspectives, as have
Woods and collaborators, and observed similar patterns.
3. Summary and a serious caution
We have outlined an approach to high order institutional
cognition which appears consonant with much contem-
porary work on distributed cognition, although our treat-
ment of resilience is far more general. What differentiates
our analysis is the invocation of classes of necessary-con-
ditions 'statistical' models based on the Rate Distortion
Theorem, in the same sense that classes of empirical
regression models are based on the Central Limit Theo-
rem. All such models, while sometimes quite compli-
cated, have a particular limited utility: the science does
not lie within the models themselves, which are simply
reexpressions of the asymptotic limit theorems of proba-
bility, but lies within comparisons between models fitted
to the same system under different conditions, or between
different systems facing similar conditions. The models
we present here, like their regression near-kin, should be
viewed as having been fitted to real systems, at least in the-
ory, rather than as themselves underlying or definingTheoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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those systems. These models do not, of themselves, cleave
the Gordian Knot of scientific inference. That, as always, is
a difficult matter of empirical and observational study.
What we have done, however, is introduce a new quanti-
tative toolkit which, when properly developed, may aid
such study. Such development, however, remains to be
done, so that particular sets of observations may be fitted
to particular models. This kind of rigorous approach will
require much time and very considerable resources. None-
theless, as the next three sections show, qualitative infer-
ences can be based on the modeling approach, and seem
to provide important new insights to previous observa-
tions.
4. AIDS in Alameda County
A particularly striking example of institutional pathology
in public health, representing a clear dysfunction of
organizational collective consciousness, is the widespread
failure of adequate response to AIDS in the United States.
We examine three case histories. The first involves a geo-
graphic region near the principal West Coast epicenter.
The second focuses on African-American religious groups
in and near New York City, the principal East Coast epi-
center. The third is a reconsideration of a broad, multi-
city, case study of systematic failure in medical care pro-
vided to HIV positive women of color.
Alameda County lies on the east side of the San Francisco
Bay from San Francisco, a virulent focus of the US AIDS
pandemic, and is closely connected to it by the commut-
ing field defined by the daily journey-to-work. Despite its
proximity, Alameda County had very low rates of AIDS
throughout the first decade of the epidemic, thus creating
the opportunity for epidemic preparedness. The Epidemic
Response in Alameda Study [100] was designed to learn
how health care organizations just outside 'Ground Zero'
for the American AIDS epidemic had responded to grow-
ing numbers of cases. The study used a three-stage epi-
demic response model, that started with recognition of an
epidemic, garnering resources and realignment of social
relationships to carry out epidemic-related tasks.
Health care agencies were enumerated using a variety of
methods, including lists of agencies maintained by the
County Department of Health, brochures of existing serv-
ices and telephone books. A total of 51 agencies were
identified. Directors of 31 agencies participated in the
study by completing a semi-structured interview and fill-
ing out an agency information sheet. Interviews were car-
ried out between March and December, 1989, well before
introduction of antiretroviral drugs.
The recognition of the epidemic was slow and tortuous,
slowed by stigma, lack of resources and lack of central
leadership from federal, state or county agencies. Rather
than the rapid mobilization of a system of organizations,
what the study documented was the individual response
of organizations that integrated new services as a result of
a push-pull process. Among the pushes were: loss of key
members of the organization to AIDS; growth of cases in
the organization's service area; and the expansion of
acknowledged 'affected' groups from gay men and intrave-
nous drugs to include women, the elderly, and many oth-
ers. Among the pulls were: new regulations imposed by
government agencies, and new monies allotted for AIDS
care. The directors were highly critical of the push-pull
process, which left most organizations to their own
devices. One director commented
"Just barely two years ago, I was coming over to [a com-
munity organization in San Francisco] and I was stealing
buttons from [the director] and pamphlets and anything
else I could steal. And I said, I have no shame because I
have no money for AIDS and I wanted to bring that infor-
mation but to my community here. So I did and, in fact,
somebody interviewed me for the newspaper once and I
said that I ran around and stole from everybody in San
Francisco that I could steal from to bring information
back to our community, until I got funding to do that. "
Garnering resources, the second stage of epidemic
response, involved money as well as many other kinds of
resources, like knowledge and connections. All of the
organizations used existing resources at the beginning of
their response to AIDS. As they began to understand the
epidemic and carve out a path of action, all of the organi-
zations looked for new resources to support new activities.
At the level of the local hospitals, this involved massive
expenditure for new forms of care. But even small organi-
zations faced serious challenges relative to their existing
and potential resources.
Central to the problems in garnering resources was the
inadequate epidemic response by the society in general.
Insufficient monies could not meet growing demands.
Therefore, the monies were shifted from one group to
another, using competition for funding to shift blame
from government to providers. After all, if an agency failed
to win a grant, it was the weakness of the application, not
the overall lack of resources. In a funding-version of musi-
cal chairs, money moved among the interest groups, cre-
ating unnecessary strife and tension. One director noted,
"I, who could have worked on policy development,
instead had to concentrate on funding. And spent a good
year and half writing proposals and find funding sources
and that kind of stuff. Thats part and parcel of doing busi-
ness in the nonprofit world, but it took a year and a half
to do that, whereas if we had been funded at the very start,
I could have spent a lot more time trying to push forwardTheoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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our AIDS services as opposed to, first of all trying to edu-
cate funders about the Asian community, and then trying
to find money for AIDS."
As the directors looked back on the eight years of epi-
demic response, it was clear that much social realignment
had occurred, changing the social landscape of the county.
New organizations were created, new coalitions were
developed, and new personal relationships were estab-
lished. One story captured the ways in which new contacts
opened doors:
"There's a way in which it's helped people on my staff per-
sonally grow. To be more comfortable with gay people.
I've one employee who's just the sweetest, most wonder-
ful person, she's in her late 20s, has a wonderful home up
in Castro Valley hills. We were talking one day about the
story about the guy taking them out to the gay bar. She
looked at me and she said, 'There's gay bars in Hayward?
Really?' she says. She was shocked. She didn't know that.
She'd never thought about it... It's gratifying to see peo-
ple's openness and ability to be comfortable and welcom-
ing, and to be touched by peoples stories and people's
lives as much as they are by the homeless. "
On the basis of these data, the process of epidemic
response in Alameda County was rated a failure. The study
identified a large number of vulnerabilities that under-
mined epidemic response, including failure of multiple
levels of government to provide leadership, widespread
stigma, perhaps representing ideological rigidity associ-
ated with certain 'risk behaviors', and lack of an organized
system of disease management that could easily incorpo-
rate new demands. Vulnerabilities are not typically con-
sidered in the planning of disaster response, yet it seems
evident that this approach should be rethought. In fact,
evidence from case studies of the crack epidemic, a fatal
school shooting, the violence epidemic, and the response
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita suggests that vulnerabili-
ties can easily derail response. Given the cost in human
suffering the potential implications of organizational
non-response to disaster should be given much more
detailed examination.
These vulnerabilities, in particular resource limitations,
and structurally-imposed Darwinian competition for
available resources, have contributed to inattentional
blindness/group denial, breakdown of intra-workspace
communication (i.e. collaboration between different
groups), and, ultimately, a systematic failure of engage-
ment, possibly exacerbated by ideological constraints
regarding 'unacceptable' risk behaviors. Although the
weaknesses were clearly recognized, 'therapeutic' inter-
ventions against this pattern seem to have largely been
ineffective for the very same reasons. This case history rep-
resents, paradoxically, an example of a pathological resil-
ience – institutional inertia – in which deep-seated
structural factors prevented effective recognition of, and
response to, a significant threat.
5. AIDS and African American churches near New York 
City
Despite their excess risk for HIV/AIDS, African American
communities have not developed a united response to
this epidemic. Community-based organizations, espe-
cially those that provide addiction treatment services,
have played an active role in developing HIV prevention
and treatment services. Other organizations, however,
have been more reticent to be involved; the churches are
notable for their failure to support efforts at epidemic con-
trol, a finding which stands in marked contrast to the
social activism that is commonly attributed to African-
American clergy [101,102].
Like others in the mainstream of US society, African Amer-
ican clergy have watched from the sidelines of the epi-
demic. African Americans are closely linked to their clergy:
70 percent of those interviewed in a national survey
reported they belong to a church and 71 percent report
regular church attendance [102]. As in any community
closely linked to its church, the role of pastors in setting
social agendas reaches into nearly every aspect of life.
Given the AIDS crisis in African American communities,
the clergy's distance from epidemic response may be con-
sidered catastrophic.
Through their long history, African American churches
have filled a dual mission in the community of ensuring
physical survival while seeking spiritual salvation. African
American churches were born out of the need to establish
a place of worship that respected the humanity of African
Americans. That struggle for personhood has never been
far from the agenda of the churches, and the entry of the
churches into the Civil Rights movement of the 1960's
marked a turning point in that effort.
While many see the need for the churches to now lend
their strength to the fight against AIDS, which has dispro-
portionately affected African American communities, oth-
ers – including many in the leadership of the churches –
view AIDS as too closely linked to 'sinful' behavior to be
an appropriate target for church activity. In contrast to the
Civil Rights movement of the 1960's, which was conso-
nant with the history and mission of the churches, the
AIDS epidemic is sufficiently dissonant as to hamper insti-
tutional involvement.
A series of structured interviews with 51 African American
clergy in and near New York City underlines this schism.
The group had three particular characteristics. First, it wasTheoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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highly diverse. There is no single experience of church or
religion, but rather many different ones, and this tradition
of difference is fundamental. Second, the group prized
their ability to interpret their holy books. Whereas in
many areas of life, African Americans follow European
Americans, in the realm of theology that is not the case.
Third, the group was slow to respond to AIDS. While one
or two individuals were active as early and 1984, the
majority moved slowly and in response to the activities of
others in the community, rather than being in the fore-
front themselves. AIDS has joined a long list of threats to
community survival, including problems of poor educa-
tion, loss of jobs, massive destruction of housing, and
drug epidemics.
The clergy talked of AIDS in dire tones, but their sense of
peril had not led to action. Rather, they were mired in a
philosophical quandary over rescuing 'sinners' from the
'consequences' of their sins. Except for a handful who saw
AIDS as a public health crisis, those interviewed linked
HIV with 'sinful' behavior. They saw it as their duty to con-
demn sin; they might or might not display equal condem-
nation for the sinner.
The unwillingness to separate health and morality was at
the heart of the hobbled effort to respond to AIDS. Clergy
were ambivalent about what to do. Further, they were
unwilling to take stands that might be controversial
within their group. As one minister noted, pastors were
reluctant to undertake AIDS activities because they feared
others would say to the, "Why are you on the bandwagon
for the gays?"
In spite of such constraints, however, at the time of the
interviews, 1995, approximately two-thirds of the clergy
interviewed had undertaken some form of AIDS activity.
The incursion of AIDS into the day-to-day life of African
Americans has thus forced many, though far from the
majority, to confront the threat to life and health posed by
the epidemic. In this context, the reality of death from
AIDS has forced clergy to grapple with issues that chal-
lenge the key assumptions which undergird their minis-
tries. Specifically, the majority of African American clergy
view the behaviors that transmit AIDS as inextricably
linked to moral concerns. Many cannot separate their role
as moral arbiters from their other social and community
roles. The concession to love the sinner but hate the sin is
an unsatisfactory compromise that fails to create a climate
of love and acceptance. Rather it feeds secrecy, shame and
stigma, all of which inhibit AIDS prevention activities.
The situation is accurately viewed as a doctrinal crisis.
Our findings underscore the extent to which, in the pres-
ence of uncertain danger and limited resources, as we have
argued above in theory, ideology can become a rate-limit-
ing factor for institutional response. Ideological struggles
are rarely considered within the purview of public health.
It is often quite difficult for those public health officials in
the employ of a society divided along such lines to
respond clearly and unequivocally to disease threat. Epi-
demic control is fundamentally a social action that
requires the coordinated efforts of many people. When
people are unable to agree on epidemic response, disease
will spread. As we understand more about the political
nature of epidemic propagation, we must alter and extend
the practice of public health to take account of these real-
ities.
6. Women's Equity in AIDS Resources
In 1999, the Health Resources and Services Administra-
tion (HRSA) commissioned five research teams to evalu-
ate the extent to which the Ryan White CARE Act was
meeting the needs of people living with AIDS. The Com-
munity Research Group, one of the teams, was asked to
assess the effectiveness of the Ryan White program in
meeting the needs of women of color living in 5 cities in
the United States. The research team made site visits to 5
US cities, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Antonio and
St. Louis. Interviews and observations and were con-
ducted; proposals and other documents were reviewed
[103,104].
At that time, a complex set of health and social services
existed to provide a range of services to women of color
living with HIV/AIDS. In each city, we found at least one
place that had assembled a wide range of interconnected
services, designed to meet the needs of poor women who
had to manage not only their own health problems but
also those of their children, other family members and
friends. These "islands of success" as the research team
dubbed them, understood that medical care needed to
supplemented by such diverse services and supports as
peer counseling, addiction treatment, housing aid, nutri-
tional guidance, day care, and many others. This broad
array of services was intended to and largely did meet the
"web of needs" [105] of women living with the virus.
But, more striking than the existence of such islands of
success was the relative scarcity of such holistic care, due,
in large part, to the relative scarcity of some components
of the package of services, and typically the shortage was
in services that were needed by women but not men. A
psychiatrist explained the kind of problems women faced:
"If you are a woman who is infected, and you have two
kids. One is infected and one is not, but both are under
the age of six. You have got to go to provider A for your
primary care for your HIV. You might have to go to pro-
vider B for your outpatient substance abuse treatment that
is on the west side of the county. Your infected child hasTheoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
Page 31 of 36
(page number not for citation purposes)
to come here to the clinic for infected kids. But your
affected child needs to go to a different provider, maybe
the health department clinic, for his immunizations. One
of those kids needs psychological services, and is being
tested for developmental delay, a perfect example. The
infected kid has a developmental delay secondary to the
viral invasion of the central system. You as a woman have
to orchestrate all of your service providers and all of the
service providers for your kids, and you've got to haul
them around almost every day. Plus youve got to go to the
store, plus you've got to get your meds, plus you've got to
go to the welfare department, plus, plus, plus It's mind
boggling."
Not only did women have more needs, but also they had
less power, education and money than men. One out-
reach worker commented,
"There is a huge gap, not only in survival rates, but in
access to care and in understanding the treatments. Again,
the men have had opportunities for education and jobs,
they're more out in the world and they are more educated,
so they can understand the information quicker than the
women. Information that is not broken down in a way
woman can relate to, and it is not women specific. The less
women know about what is available to them, the less of
a choice they have."
Decisions about the distribution of Ryan White Care dol-
lars were influenced by community boards. Making sure
that those boards acknowledged womens web of needs
appeared to be an incompletely solved problem. As one
interviewee put it:
"We need more representation of women on committees
when different things are coming up and decisions are
being made. Our health care is being based on how men
have been taken care of in the past, and we are quite a bit
different. We need to have a larger say-so on what is being
decided."
Though women needed to be involved in the political
process, they were hindered from doing so by cultural,
financial and logistical problems. During a focus group at
one clinic, a staff member pointed out, "Unfortunately,
you can't bring in 10 infected women to stand up and
make statements, they are just not ready to do that. And
that is how a lot of gay men get services. Infected women
don't have that type of voice."
A number of comments suggested that this inability to
participate in the politics of AIDS care was culturally-
based. One case manager observed:
"Women do not feel empowered. They do lots for their
children and partners and put themselves last. There is
culturally no power for women over sexuality in many
communities. What should a woman do when sex and
non-decisions are forced on her? Harm reduction must
start young and women must be given power early. They
need to be taught more about relationships and self-
esteem."
Disempowerment was also related to the extenuating cir-
cumstances in which poor women of color often found
themselves. A program coordinator at one center said:
"Minority women in treatment have a lot going on besides
their HIV status. Most women as [our clinic] are the pri-
mary care takers of their families the primary income
earners. They are undereducated and underemployed.
They not only have to face disclosure issues, but also
issues related to race and poverty. Daily, they stack all
these issues on top of one another and sort out what they
will address. At [our clinic], the women are allowed to
incorporate all these things, whereas if they were just
going to their doctor's office, they would not mention
they don't have a phone. The staff at [our clinic] wants to
know about things that are going on in their clients' daily
lives and want to assist them in day-to-day activities.
There are a lot of things that keep infected women from
taking care of themselves. [Our clinic] tries to put daily liv-
ing up front while helping women take time out for them-
selves."
Given an inadequately organized care system, women's
web of needs was unlikely to be adequately addressed.
This was not ameliorated by the system of community
governance, which simply served to pit underserved com-
munities against one another. In that system, women
were at a great disadvantage, which worsened their situa-
tion.
Here resource limitation and competition, in concert with
community disintegration, policy-driven limits causing
service fragmentation, and very traditional, culturally-
induced, inattentional blindness to the needs of poor
women of color, combined synergistically to greatly
undercut distributed institutional cognition affecting the
provision of medical care and other essential services
needed by this population.
7. Final remarks
One central outcome of our analysis has been an under-
standing that both social disintegration and resource lim-
itation/competition can have much the same effect in
degrading the ability of institutions to respond coherently
to patterns of threat and opportunity, creating pathologies
of inattentional blindness (IAB), failed internal commu-Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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nication and fragmentation (RD), and ideological or pol-
icy rigidity (PI). Such effects will be generated by imposed
systems of draconian triage which limit institutional col-
lective consciousness, trapping organizations, and their
individual members, in pathological regimes of ecological
resilience, various kinds of social eutrophication. Other,
less subtle, historical paths, like disasters, produce similar
results, which will be very resistant to change.
Communities, however, particularly constitute the unique
riches of the poor, and those which are both socially dis-
integrated and poverty stricken will suffer synergistic bur-
dens of institutional failure reflected in acute patterns of
disease, violence, and substance abuse, which may be
highly persistent.
Another central outcome has been the obvious role which
internal organizational diversity – existence of multiple,
different, global workspaces – can play in lessening the
probability of organizational inattentional blindness.
Many, very different foci, i.e. many different R0's, can limit
IAB, provided institutional rate distortion is modest – the
different parts of the system talk to one another. The
model is that 'many eyes can look in many directions'.
As a reviewer has noted, others have reached similar con-
clusions without the mathematical overhead. Woods and
Hollnagel [63], for example, describe classic patterns of
institutional error which appear to fit our model, includ-
ing production pressure, fragmented problem solving,
failure to revise assessments in the face of new evidence,
and impaired communication and coordination. The
reviewer particularly cited Woods' [106] comment on the
Columbia space shuttle disaster: "What is striking is how
there was a fragmented view of what was known about the
strike and its potential implications over time, people,
and groups. There was no place, artifact, or person who
had a complete and coherent view of the analysis of the
foam strike event".
Our work seems broadly consonant with mainstream
research on distributed cognition, although our treatment
of resilience is more informed by ecological than engi-
neering paradigms, and our insistence on the central
importance of culture in distributed cognition and institu-
tional collective consciousness parallels continuing
debates on ways culture affects individual psychology.
Responses to AIDS in the US provide many case histories
in which imposed resource limitation and policy-driven
social disintegration – structural violence – created insti-
tutional pathologies of denial, failed communication,
and doctrinal inflexibility hindering epidemic response.
These become rigidly locked-in, absent the massive infu-
sion of resources and intensive community organizing
which might enable social reintegration. Wallace and
Wallace [89] and Fullilove [93], among others, show in
some detail how relentless policies of serial forced dis-
placement have gutted social organization within US
minority communities, generating high rates of disease,
substance abuse, and violence, while undercutting possi-
ble responses by institutions within the affected commu-
nities.
We end where we began. Humans in small, disciplined
teams are the most fearsome predators on Earth. Partly,
this is because the institutional collective consciousness of
such groups, while not operating at the few hundred mil-
liseconds of individual consciousness, is still very fast,
while having both improved ability to act and decrease in
the likelihood of being blindsided or suffering workspace
failures. However institutional collective consciousness at
larger scales seems far more complicated, and prone, as
well, to particular errors and the vicissitudes of irreversible
Lamarckian evolutionary process and pathological resil-
ience.
Given the massive overt and structural violence of our
times, these are not small matters, and our ability to man-
ufacture vast social institutions, and the evident difficul-
ties in correcting their pathologies, may, over the long




According to the structure of the underlying language of
which a message is a particular expression, some messages
are more 'meaningful' than others, that is, are in accord
with the grammar and syntax of the language. The Shan-
non-McMillan or Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem,
describes how messages themselves are to be classified
[33-35].
Suppose a long sequence of symbols is chosen, using the
output of the random variable X above, so that an output
sequence of length n, with the form
xn = (α0, α1, ..., αn-1)
has joint and conditional probabilities
P(X0 = α0, X1 = α1, ..., Xn-1 = αn-1)
P(Xn = αn|X0 = α0, ..., Xn-1 = αn-1).   (21)
Using these probabilities we may calculate the condi-
tional uncertainty
H(Xn|X0, X1, ..., Xn-1).Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2007, 4:10 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/4/1/10
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The uncertainty of the information source, H[X], is defined
as
In general
H(Xn|X0, X1, ..., Xn-1) ≤ H(Xn).
Only if the random variables Xj are all stochastically inde-
pendent does equality hold. If there is a maximum n such
that, for all m > 0
H(Xn+m|X0, ..., Xn+m-1 = H(Xn|X0, ..., Xn-1),
then the source is said to be of order n. It is easy to show
that
In general the outputs of the Xj, j = 0, 1,..., n are dependent.
That is, the output of the communication process at step
n depends on previous steps. Such serial correlation, in
fact, is the very structure which enables most of what is
done in this paper.
Here, however, the processes are all assumed stationary in
time, that is, the serial correlations do not change in time,
and the system is stationary.
A very broad class of such self-correlated, stationary, infor-
mation sources, the so-called ergodic sources for which the
long-run relative frequency of a sequence converges sto-
chastically to the probability assigned to it, have a partic-
ularly interesting property:
It is possible, in the limit of large n, to divide all sequences
of outputs of an ergodic information source into two dis-
tinct sets, S1 and S2, having, respectively, very high and
very low probabilities of occurrence, with the source
uncertainty providing the splitting criterion. In particular
the Shannon-McMillan Theorem states that, for a (long)
sequence having n  (serially correlated) elements, the
number of 'meaningful' sequences, N(n) – those belong-
ing to set S1 – will satisfy the relation
More formally,
Using the internal structures of the information source
permits limiting attention only to high probability 'meaning-
ful' sequences of symbols.
The Rate Distortion Theorem
The Shannon-McMillan Theorem can be expressed as the
'zero error limit' of the Rate Distortion Theorem [35,107],
which defines a splitting criterion that identifies high
probability pairs of sequences. We follow closely the treat-
ment of [35].
The origin of the problem is the question of representing
one information source by a simpler one in such a way
that the least information is lost. For example we might
have a continuous variate between 0 and 100, and wish to
represent it in terms of a small set of integers in a way that
minimizes the inevitable distortion that process creates.
Typically, for example, an analog audio signal will be
replaced by a 'digital' one. The problem is to do this in a
way which least distorts the reconstructed audio waveform.
Suppose the original stationary, ergodic information
source Y with output from a particular alphabet generates
sequences of the form
yn = y1, ..., yn.
These are 'digitized,' in some sense, producing a chain of
'digitized values'
bn = b1, ..., bn,
where the b-alphabet is much more restricted than the y-
alphabet.
bn is, in turn, deterministically retranslated into a reproduc-
tion of the original signal yn. That is, each bm is mapped on
to a unique n-length y-sequence in the alphabet of the
information source Y:
Note, however, that many yn sequences may be mapped
onto the same retranslation sequence  n, so that informa-
tion will, in general, be lost.
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The central problem is to explicitly minimize that loss.
The retranslation process defines a new stationary, ergodic
information source,  .
The next step is to define a distortion measure, d(y, ),
which compares the original to the retranslated path. For
example the Hamming distortion is
d(y,  ) = 1, y ≠ 
d(y,  ) = 0, y = .   (25)
For continuous variates the Squared error distortion is
d(y,  ) = (y - )2.   (26)
There are many possibilities.
The distortion between paths yn and  nis defined as
Suppose that with each path yn and bn-path retranslation
into the y-language and denoted yn, there are associated
individual, joint, and conditional probability distribu-
tions
p(yn), p( n), p(yn| n).
The average distortion is defined as
It is possible, using the distributions given above, to
define the information transmitted from the incoming Y
to the outgoing   process in the usual manner, using the
Shannon source uncertainty of the strings:
I(Y, )  ≡ H(Y) - H(Y|)  =  H(Y) + H()  -  H(Y, ).
If there is no uncertainty in Y given the retranslation  ,
then no information is lost.
In general, this will not be true.
The information rate distortion function R(D) for a source Y
with a distortion measure d(y,  ) is defined as
The minimization is over all conditional distributions
p(y| ) for which the joint distribution p(y, )  =
p(y)p(y| ) satisfies the average distortion constraint (i.e.
average distortion ≤ D).
The Rate Distortion Theorem states that R(D) is the maxi-
mum achievable rate of information transmission which does
not exceed the distortion D. References [35,107] provide
details.
More to the point, however, is the following: Pairs of
sequences (yn,  n) can be defined as distortion typical; that
is, for a given average distortion D, defined in terms of a
particular measure, pairs of sequences can be divided into
two sets, a high probability one containing a relatively
small number of (matched) pairs with d(yn,  n) ≤ D, and
a low probability one containing most pairs. As n → ∞, the
smaller set approaches unit probability, and, for those
pairs,
p(yn) ≥ p( n|yn) exp[-nI(Y, )]
Thus, roughly speaking, I(Y,  ) embodies the splitting
criterion between high and low probability pairs of paths.
For the theory of interacting information sources, then,
I(Y,  ) can play the role of H in the dynamic treatment
that follows.
The rate distortion function can actually be calculated in
many cases by using a Lagrange multiplier method – see
Section 13.7 of [35].
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